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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SECURITY REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
Akın, Berivan 
M.A. Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali Karasar 
May 2009 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an examination of regional security 
cooperation in Central Asia. The last resurgence of regionalism became a driving 
force for regional cooperation in Central Asia. In this process, the role of major 
powers, regional security threats and international system is very crucial. The aim of 
this thesis is to provide a deep assessment of these determinants.  
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and small Central Asian 
regional security initiatives were evaluated in this thesis. Due to that, the role of three 
major powers, Russia, the US and China in Central Asian regional security is studied 
in this work.  
 iv
This thesis emphasized on the current developments especially after the 
September 11 attacks. The US operation on Afghanistan following September 11 
attacks accelerated regional cooperation in Central Asia.  
Contrary to the mainstream literature based on realist theory, focus on the 
competition between major powers for influence in the Central Asian region. This 
thesis argues that Central Asian security needs and major powers pragmatic concerns 
in the region coincide with the increasing regionalism approaches in the world 
politics. This coincidence will increase regional cooperation on security affairs. 
Moreover, major power cooperation will replace major powers competition in order 
to provide stability and security in the world and particularly in Central Asia. 
Key Words: Regionalism, Security Regionalism, Central Asia, Regional 
cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, NATO PfP. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ORTA ASYA’DA GÜVENLİK BÖLGESELLİĞİ 
 
Akın, Berivan 
Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Hasan Ali Karasar 
Mayıs 2009 
 
Bu tezin amacı Orta Asya'da bölgesel güvenlik işbirliği incelemesi 
sağlamaktır. Bölgesellik kavramının en son yükselişi, Orta Asya bölgesel işbirliği 
için bir itici güç oldu. Bu süreçte, büyük güçler, bölgesel güvenlik tehditleri ve 
uluslararası sistemin rolü çok önemlidir. Bu tezin amacı bu belirleyicilerin bu 
süreçteki rolünü değerlendirmektir.  
Kolektif Güvenlik Antlaşması Örgütü (KGAÖ), Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü 
(ŞİÖ), NATO'nun Barış İçin Ortaklık (BİO) ve küçük boyutlarda Orta Asya bölgesel 
güvenlik girişimleri bu tezde değerlendirildi. Bu nedenle, üç büyük güçler, Rusya, 
ABD ve Çin’in, Orta Asya’nın bölgesel güvenliğindeki rolü bu çalışıldı.  
Bu tez son gelişmeleri, özellikle 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonrasındaki dönemin atlı 
çizildi. 11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından yapılan Afganistan’daki Amerikan 
operasyonu, Orta Asya bölgesel işbirliği hızlandırmıştır.  
 vi
Orta Asya bölgesinde nüfuz rekabetinin büyük güçler arasındaki çatışmaya 
sebep olacağını iddia eden hakim literatür realist teoriye dayanmaktadır. Bu tez Orta 
Asya güvenlik ihtiyaçları ve büyük güçlerin faydacı çıkarları ile dünya siyasetinde 
giderek artan bölgesel yaklaşımların ortak paydada buluştuğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu 
tesadüf güvenlik meseleleri üzerinde bölgesel işbirliğini artıracaktır. Öte yandan, 
Dünya’da ve özellikle Orta Asya’da istikrar ve güvenliği sağlamak için büyük güç 
işbirliği büyük güçler rekabet yerini alacaktır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgesellik, Güvenlik bölgeselliği, Orta Asya, Bölgesel 
işbirliği, Kolektif Güvenlik Antlaşması Örgütü, Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü, NATO'nun 
Barış İçin Ortaklık. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an examination of the regional security 
cooperation in Central Asia that considers current developments especially 
September 11 attacks to the United States. The dissolution of the Soviet Union 
overlapped with the last resurgence of regionalism and this became a driving force 
for regional cooperation in Central Asia. However, especially the US operation on 
Afghanistan accelerated regional cooperation. Old regional security cooperation such 
as Collective Security Treaty (CST) and Shanghai Five reorganized and became new 
security organizations for being suitable to the new security environment in the 
region. Furthermore, NATO PfP program increased its bilateral relations with 
Central Asian partners.  
The research question of this thesis is that of whether Central Asia could be 
evolved into a regional security complex and whether regional cooperation 
organization and major powers play positive or negative roles in this process. A 
regional approach that covers major power politics and organizations sponsored by 
them is necessary for a region, which shares mutual security threats. Mutual security 
threats connect Central Asian states to each other. The aim of this thesis is to provide 
 2 
a deep assessment of the role of major powers and regional organizations to the 
security regionalism in Central Asia.  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of fifteen new states 
in diverse regions of Eurasia. In Central Asia, five new nation-states declared their 
independence consecutively: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Kazakhstan. These declarations ended nearly 130 years of Russian and Soviet rule; 
however, uncertainty was widespread in the aftermath. By signing Alma-Ata 
Declaration, Central Asia’s newly independent states became founding members1 of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which replaced the Soviet Union in 
December of 1991.2 This declaration defined the CIS as “a community of 
independent and sovereign states” and underlined that the commonwealth was not to 
be “a political union, federation or confederation.”3 The euphoria of independence 
flourished in such circumstances, but the old system ended with many new questions 
unanswered. For this reason, independence was not an end in itself, only a means in 
the hands of those newly emerged nation-states.4 
In a certain sense Central Asian states were alone and faced with difficulties 
in the transition to democracy and market economies as part of an international 
system which was itself passing through a period  of transformation. This coincided 
with the international resurgence of regionalism. The last resurgence of regionalism 
in 1980s, which is called second wave of regionalism, provided an opportunity for 
regional cooperation in Central Asia. Central Asian states welcomed this 
                                                 
1 Only Turkmenistan decreased its full membership to associate member in August 2005.  See  
Valentinas Mite,"Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty." August 29, 
2005.http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/26DAB4C9-5BA1-4193-86E7-
62FC991F8A6C.html (accessed April 7, 2008). 
2 Roy Allison, and Christoph Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 1. 
3 Gregory Gleason, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.53, No.7, 2001, pp. 1077-1095. 
4 Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, (Colorado: Westview Pres, 
1997), p. 4. 
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development with a view to overcoming the difficulties of political and economic 
transition. However, regional cooperation was a neither a remedy for all the 
problems in the region nor did the establishment of effective regional cooperation 
come easily. This troublesome period was affected by several different dynamics. 
Cooperative and conflicting dynamics within the region combined with regional 
power politics and major powers created a prototypical region with respect to the 
examination of regionalism a phenomenon.   
Power politics was one of the central determinants in this process. Central 
Asian states were historically bound to each other and dependent on Russia. 
Moreover, as an area secluded from the Western bloc during Soviet rule, Central 
Asia’s untapped energy resources and newly opened markets drew international 
attention. Regional security threats, which threatened world stability, posed another 
concern for global and regional powers. For this reason, Central Asia was closely 
observed by the major powers: Russia, China, the EU and USA, and regional powers 
such as Iran and Turkey and to some extent Pakistan and India. 
During the 1990s, the academia experienced a boom regarding the subject of 
regionalism. Broadly defined, regionalism involving political, economic and security 
cooperation began to be used as a concept by many different fields. In international 
relations, regionalism has specific consequences for politics, economics and security. 
However, this thesis emphasizes regional cooperation on security issues while 
nonetheless observing that the conceptualization of security is difficult and changes 
over time. This thesis aims to survey emerging security challenges in the world, 
which exceed the limits of a realist conceptualization of security.  
 Many theoretical studies have appeared on the topic of security-based 
regionalism while regional case studies have also considerably increased in number. 
 4 
One of the most important regions in the post-Soviet period was Central Asia. The 
most comprehensive study of this area is “Central Asian Security: The New 
International Context” by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson. This work aimed “to 
analyze the changing security policy challenges in Central Asia since Russia became 
more disengaged from the region in the mid-to late 1990s, and to discuss the security 
policy relevance of the expanding network of relationships between Central Asian 
states and regional and international powers”.5 It broadly emphasizes the internal and 
external dynamics in this process. It analyzes major powers and regional powers and 
extends the scope of security concerns to new challenges such as radical Islam, the 
problem of sharing natural resources, and energy security. However, this valuable 
study, written in 2001, tries to clarify security cooperation in the region. However, it 
overlooked some crucial events for Central Asia such as the September 11 attacks 
and the recovery of Russian power in the region. For this reason, their claims are 
based on the disengagement of Russia from the region. However, in a recent article 
Anna Matveeva explains the Russians’ return to the region by underlining changes in 
the foreign policy from less intensive “Near Abroad” policy to the more assertive 
stance adopted by Russia especially in the second term of President Putin with the 
overall improvement of conditions in Russia.6 The author claims that the return of 
Russian power to the region is related to the increasing American and Western 
advances toward the area after the September 11 attacks. Neil Macfarlane’s article 
also deserves attention concerning this point. He emphasizes American foreign 
policy in the region and notes on American attitude towards regionalism in Central 
Asia. He suggests that American policy could not develop regionalism in Central 
                                                 
5 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Central Asian Security: The New International Context, (Washington: 
Brooking Institution Press, 2001), p. 4. 
6 Anna Matveeva, “Return to Heartland: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia”, The International Spectator 
42:1,  March 2007,  pp. 43-44. 
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Asia. The author summarized American aims as “to the limited extent that the United 
States displays interest in structures of regional cooperation, and in a manner similar 
to other external powers, it seeks to promote structures of multilateral cooperation 
which enjoys a dominant position. It largely ignores cooperative structures emerging 
within the region, and is wary of structures where other powers are preponderant”.7 
In 2004, Roy Allison renewed his approach towards the Russian role in Central Asia 
in his article, “Regionalism and regional structures and security management in 
Central Asia”.  The author took into consideration the reassertion of Russian power 
and used this development in his assessment of security-related regionalism in 
Central Asia. He concluded that the weakness of security-related regionalism is not 
only related to local states and their leaders but to the factors beyond their control.8 
 China, another major power in the equation, has attempted to consolidate its 
role by developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China had tried to 
demonstrate to the world community that its presence is indispensable for Central 
Asian security. In his article, “China’s Security Interests in Central Asia,” Russell 
Ong underlined this assessment particularly in China’s approach towards security 
issues. He advocated a broader concept of security beyond military security: his 
study covers political and economic security as well. Furthermore, he stresses great 
power competition and the role of China in this competition for understanding 
Chinese security interests in the region.9 
This great powers competition in the region is known as the “New Great 
Game,” a reference to the 19th century competition between the British and Russian 
                                                 
7 Neil S. Macfarlane, “The United States and regionalism in Central Asia”, International Affairs, 80, 
3, 2004, p. 460. 
8  Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structure and Security Management in Central Asia”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, 2004,  pp.482-483. 
9 Russell Ong, “China’s Security Interest in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, (December, 2005) 
24 (4), pp. 425-437. 
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Empires. However, this comparison is not based on concrete evidence or on an 
academic approach. It is rather a speculative assessment that aims to increase the 
world’s attention to the region. With respect to this point Lutz Kleveman’s “The 
New Great Game: Blood and Oil” should be mentioned. This book tries to associate 
current competition for energy resources in the region with the historical Great 
Game. Although, the author did attempt to prove his assessments to some degree, the 
work is speculative, not academic.10  
 Contrary to the mainstream literature based on realist theory, which focuses 
on the competition between major powers for influence in the Central Asian region, 
this thesis argues that Central Asian security needs and pragmatic concerns of major 
powers with respect to the region coincide with the increase of regional approaches 
in world politics. This coincidence, I argue, will further increase regional cooperation 
on security affairs. Moreover, I believe the cooperation of major power will replace 
competition in order to provide stability and security both generally and especially in 
Central Asia. 
The present thesis contains five chapters. After the introduction, the second 
chapter provides an overview of regionalism and security-based regional 
cooperation. The resurgence of regionalism is an important determinant in the 
development of Central Asian security and for this reason, it is crucial to understand 
its historical and theoretical background. Furthermore, before undertaking a case 
study of regional security cooperation in Central Asia, it is necessary to deeply 
investigate the theoretical base of regional security cooperation. A detailed analysis 
of Barry Buzan’s “Regional Security Complex Theory” provides the required 
groundwork for responding to the question of whether Central Asian States can 
                                                 
10 Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, (New York: Grove Press, 
2003) 
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create a regional security complex. A part of this chapter evaluates Central Asian 
security threats such as radical Islam, terrorism, the sharing of natural resources, and 
trans-border organized crime. Furthermore, a detailed examination of role of these 
issues in the evolution of a regional security complex and their impact on the 
relations of Central Asian states is necessary to answer the question of whether 
Central Asia could become a regional security complex without the sponsorship of 
external powers.  
The third chapter discusses the evolution of regional security cooperation in 
Central Asia. Regional organizations will be divided into two parts: the cooperative 
regional security structures in Greater Eurasia, and Central Asian regional 
cooperative structures. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) are sponsored by major powers, while the Central Asian Economic 
Community and some smaller organizations are Central Asian States initiatives. In 
this chapter, the historical background of such organizations, their aims, and the most 
recent events is examined. This chapter also considers response these structures to 
regional security challenges, a key determinant in understanding the role of these 
structures in the development of a regional security complex in Central Asia. 
Chapter four analyzes the role of major powers in Central Asian security 
structures. It emphasizes the place of Russia, China, and the USA as major powers. 
Hegemonic sponsorships have had different effects on the regionalism in Central 
Asia. Therefore, the role of USA, Russia and China is significant in this process. 
Some academics have defined the relations between these powers as competitive and 
termed this competition a “New Great Game.” The conclusion responds to this claim. 
 8 
Chapter six, by way of conclusion attempts to join the theoretical background 
with the historical realities. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL SECURITY: 
A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 Regionalism 
 
After the end of the Cold War, regionalism became one of the outstanding 
subjects in academic circles. In the social sciences, this led to the increase in the 
study of regionalism in many different fields such as international relations, 
international economics, European studies, and international political economy. The 
conceptualization of regionalism differs widely in these spheres. Regionalism is a 
concept that evokes different things to different people.11 This thesis based its 
assumptions of regionalism on those adopted in the area of international relations.  
In this context, many old terms and phenomena have increased in importance 
and renewed the meaning of regionalism as being suitable to the new international 
sphere that was shaped after the end of the Cold War. In this process, the concept of 
a “New Regionalism” attracted considerable attention. To understand the concept of 
                                                 
11 Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, New Political Economy, Vol.1, No: 4, Dec. 2005, 
p. 543. 
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“New Regionalism” it is crucial to appreciate the path of regionalism’s progress. The 
second part of this chapter considers the historical background of regionalism. 
Before analyzing the historical background, it is critical to understand the 
conceptualization of regionalism. Therefore, the first part of this chapter summarizes 
the definitions of regionalism by different academics and offers an original 
conceptualization of regionalism. Academic circles have disregarded the theoretical 
developments of regionalism and so theories of regionalism newly separated from 
the classical theories of international relations have developed. The third part of this 
chapter provides a brief summary of theoretical background of regionalism. In the 
concluding part, the different dimensions of regionalism are summarized by way of 
explanation before the final section on security regionalism. 
 
 
2.1.1 The Conceptualization of Regionalism 
 
It has to be underlined that defining concepts of region, regionalism, and 
regionalization is often complicated. What emerged from these concepts is that 
region and even region does not have a standard definition. After summarizing the 
main approaches to these concepts, I offer a coherent conceptualization.  
The notion of a region in international relations is different from its pure 
geographical definition context based on a simple territorial concept. A basic 
definition of a region is a limited number of states connected to each other by a 
geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence.12 
                                                 
12 Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544. 
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A more comprehensive approach as defined by Björn Hettne includes in 
addition to the definition mentioned above, the sharing of common ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, social, and historical bonds.13 Louise Fawcett argues for a more flexible 
definition and defined regions as “units or zones based on groups, states or territories 
whose members share some identifiable traits. A central character of such zones is 
that they are smaller than the international system of states but larger than any 
individual state or non-state unit; they may be permanent or temporary, 
institutionalized or not”.14 In this respect, the definition of regions ought to 
incorporate commonality, interaction, and the possibility of cooperation.15 
Additionally, Andrew Hurell claims that there are no natural regions or natural 
definitions of region. The critical point is how political actors perceive and interpret 
a region because “all regions are socially constructed and hence politically 
contested”.16 
An important contribution to the definition of region appeared in a study of 
Raimo Vayrynen. He divided regions into physical and functional categories. 
According to Vayrynen physical regions refer to territorial, military, and economic 
areas that are primarily controlled by states, while functional regions incorporate 
non-territorial factors such as culture and markets that are often under the influence 
of non-state actors.17  
The present thesis bases its assumptions on a minimal definition of region as a 
specific geographical area, whether designed according to national territories or not. 
A region according to this definition is required to possess a mutual interdependence 
                                                 
13 Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544. 
14 Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective” in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and 
Luk Van Langenhove, (eds), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), p.24. 
15Fawcett, “Regionalism from a Historical Perspective”, p.24. 
16 Andrew Hurell, ‘Regionalism in theoretical perspective’ in Louise Fawcett, and Andrew Hurell 
(eds), Regionalism in World Politics, (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1995), pp. 38-39. 
17 Raimo Vayrynen, ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, International Studies Review, (2003), 5, p. 27. 
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within these units. The level of interdependence is not important, this only affects the 
level of regional integration not the existence of a region itself. Regions are not 
limited by the territories of states; rather it is possible that they will include only 
some parts of a state. One should note that regions are not natural or given but they 
are creations. Therefore, they might disintegrate and reintegrate due to changes at the 
national, regional, or international level.18 
At this point, it is important to distinguish a region from a regional 
organization. Regional organizations are formal, state creations that promote 
cooperation in an arena for their shared interests. However, regions are real, not 
merely formal.19 
Generally, the terms “regionalism” and “regionalization” are used 
interchangeably. Consequently, it is desirable to distinguish regionalization from 
regionalism even though there is no consensus on the conceptualization of these 
terms. Andrew Hurell defines regionalization as “the growth of societal integration 
within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic 
interaction”.20 He argued that regionalization is not necessarily a conscious policy of 
state(s) and could overlap with national boundaries.21  
Björn Hettne defines regionalism as a both a tendency and a political 
commitment to arrange the world in terms of regions: clearly, regionalism is a 
specific regional project and that project can be based on states or not.22 According to 
him, regionalization is more complex than the processes of forming regions 
consciously planned or spontaneously occurring. Moreover, he has augmented the 
                                                 
18 Björn Hettne, and Fredrik Söderbaum, ‘Theorizing the Rise of Regionness’, New Political 
Economy, Vol.5, No: 3, 2000, p. 461-462. 
19 Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism’, p. 544. 
20  Hurell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, p. 39 
21  Hurell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, p. 40 
22 Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, p. 545 
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scholarly literature by formulating the concept of region building. This signifies “the 
ideas, dynamics and means that contribute to changing a geographical area into a 
politically constructed community”.23  
According to Andrew Hurrell; “Regionalism is an extremely complex and 
dynamic process founded upon not one but a series of interacting and often 
competing logics – logics of economic and technological transformation and societal 
integration; logics of power-political competition; logics of security (both interstate 
and societal); and logics of identity and community”.24 To understand the process of 
regionalism and to predict the outcome of this process is difficult because of these 
multiple and competing rationales. Within the process of regionalism, there are states 
and non-state actors that complicate the process of this project. The target of this 
policy is to pursue and promote common goals in some areas of concern.25 However, 
because of its complexity, it is not easy to predict the result. 
Two concepts that are generally confused are “regional cooperation” and 
“regional integration.” Regional cooperation is based on individual nation states’ 
interests, and this process involves the accommodation of those interests by all 
partners. Regional integration on the other hand includes the idea of sharing national 
sovereignty.26   
The present thesis views regionalism as a state-led program and strategy, which 
may or may not lead to formal institution building and regionalization. This process 
paves the way for patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity, and 
convergence in a geographical area exceeding the territorial delimitation of states.27 
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However, it is crucial to stress that in this world order, regionalism projects are 
generally limited by state territories; however, the increase in globalization will alter 
this. 
 
 
2.1.2 The Historical Background of Regionalism 
 
Regionalism became a prominent concept in the study of international relations 
after the end of the Second World War. Although very few regional groupings 
existed before the Second World War, it would be premature to talk about a 
conceptualization of regionalism.  After the end of the war, the Cold War replaced 
the old European order. Three centuries of a multipolar structure of the international 
system focused on Europe disappeared and a bipolar system emerged.28 The world 
was divided between two camps headed by two superpowers – the USA and USSR–, 
which were competing for areas of influence.  
Initially this world system increased not only the importance of regions for the 
superpowers but also the assertiveness and self-consciousness of regions 
themselves.29 The increasing importance of the region as a unit of analysis also 
appeared in the charter of the United Nations (UN) that tried to encourage new hopes 
that had evaporated because of the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the 
war. Idealist approaches drew a picture of a new world system in which regional 
                                                 
28 Birthe Hansen, and Bertel Heurlin, The New World Order: Contrasting Theories, (London: 
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agencies would be the first resort in dealing with disputes among its members and 
would support the UN.30  
A subordinate and secondary role was assigned to regions and regionalism in 
post-war period, which generated a reaction towards nation states and nationalism.31 
However, the UN was paralyzed by East-West rivalry, and puppet regional agencies 
replaced early utopian expectations with a realist understanding that international 
agencies could perform only modest services when everything is bound to a power 
struggle.32 Even regional organizations were dependent on the superpowers and their 
roles in the game were determined by their rivalry. This remains an important 
precedent for regionalism.  
The main effect of bipolarity on regions and regional powers was to deprive 
them of independence and self-sufficiency.33 Nevertheless, the steady growth and 
expansion of interdependence during the Cold War period unquestionably generated 
an institutional and regional momentum that has enveloped the world and influenced 
each state’s behavior at some level.34 This momentum continued to spread into new 
and diverse fields.35  
Under the Cold War system, regionalism and regionalization demonstrated 
some fluctuations and consequently the metaphor of regional “waves” emerged.36 
This is a reference to waves of democratization. This idea suggests the first major 
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wave of regionalism occurred during 1960s and the second one that we know as the 
“new regionalism” started in the late 1980s. However, this is an oversimplification. 
Regional activities increased when the international system was more ambiguous and 
uncertain in Cold War period. During these times, countries were searching for new 
foreign policy options that were independent of superpowers. Indeed, these power 
vacuums were generally not lasting. As a result, such waves of regionalism involved 
dreams and disappointments. Under a rigid bipolar system, regional organizations are 
usually under the influence and control of one superpower. Although in a unipolar or 
multipolar world system regional settings have more room to maneuver, this does not 
mean that they are independent of the international system. 
The notion of “waves” of regionalism did not take into consideration the 
resurgence of regionalism in Third World during 1970s under the Cold War system 
but contrary to its fundamental structure based on East-West rivalry. This was an 
appeal for an independence movement in Third World countries, which led to the 
establishment of the Non-Aligned movement and the Group of 77.37  
Generally, regionalism was seen as a “southern” concept because under-
developed and developing states needed regional organizations to acquire a seat and 
the right to speak. “For weaker states regionalism has provided a point of entry into a 
western dominated order in which their interests are often perceived as marginalized, 
and also a forum where interaction and agenda setting are possible”.38 However, 
Third World regionalism is different because this challenges the system, as a whole 
while on the other hand the aim of those countries in the latter example is to become 
a part of the system. In addition, it is a common belief that regional organizations are 
always disposable for major powers when their national interests are at stake. Still, 
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regionalism is currently a trend and for this reason, states take part in this process 
because “regionalism may provide a mere veneer of respectability and legitimacy to 
traditional state endeavor”.39 
 The Cold War was a key period for regionalism and regionalization. These 
concepts were instructive not only in economic integration and in institutional 
development, but also in balancing power, non-alignment and the development of 
security communities. During this time, many new actors entered the international 
scene, which also had a regional focus, such as transnational and non- governmental 
actors, multinational corporations, and aid agencies, which together shifted the 
normative frame of regional operations. Many regional organizations of the time 
survived the end of the Cold War and they adapted their agendas and even their 
charters to the new international system, which was evolving new economic and 
security architecture.40 
At the end of the Cold war, the world displayed simultaneous examples of 
integration and fragmentation. On the one hand, the Soviet Union collapsed and new 
states emerged, on the other, an intensified interest in regionalism caused the 
appearance of cooperative arrangements and resulted in integration through either 
formal or informal institutions.41 Although the end of the Cold War offered new 
scope and opportunity for regional organizations, limitations and constraints on 
regional behavior did not disappear. The number and range of regional organizations 
increased when the international system was decentralized and the overlay of 
superpower dominance was removed. The USA emerged the winner of the Cold War 
but the establishment of a new international system takes time. Whether the present 
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international system is unipolar or multipolar is yet unclear. Nonetheless, the end of 
the bipolar system led to the restoration of regional sovereignty.42 
At the end of the 1980s, the success of European integration and changes in the 
international system resulted in a favorable environment for regional initiatives.  
Regional options became appealing to leaders and the number of regional structures 
increased. This latest resurgence of regionalism in the late 1980s was termed the 
“New Regionalism” and has different traits from the “Old Regionalism.” However, it 
is important to emphasize that regionalism did not reveal sharp distinctions. Rather 
this process was similar to an evolution. Under a different international system, the 
effects of globalization shaped the New Regionalism. 
The number, scope, and diversity of regionalizing structures grew significantly 
in this period.43 The resurgence of interest in regionalism after the end of the Cold 
War was not limited by the European example. Instead, momentum increased in 
Asia, Africa, and the Americas.44 The New Regionalism has a multidimensional, 
multiactor and multilevel character in a globalized context. One of the main 
differences from the Old Regionalism is this structural complexity.45 During the Cold 
War, every level of analysis – national, regional, international– was bound to the 
international system. With the end of the Cold War, both the character and functions 
of regions experienced a major transformation. Changes in the international system 
have had tremendous effects on the structural relationship between the global, 
regional and national context.46  
In this new international system, small powers are not mere puppets of 
superpowers and the foreign policy options of these powers were enlarged.  The Old 
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Regionalism had specific objectives but the New Regionalism is multifaceted and 
more comprehensive than the older paradigm.47 On an institutional level, the new 
regionalism is also different from its predecessor. In some cases, the formal and in 
other cases, the informal structures of institutions are important characteristics of the 
New Regionalism.  
The international system was under the remarkable influence of globalization 
during the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s. The relationship between 
regionalism and globalization is an important determinant in the success of 
regionalism. There are two different ideas regarding the relationship between 
regionalism and globalization: regionalism is described either as a challenge to 
globalization or as an element of globalization.48 It is clear that regionalizing 
initiatives retain the fear of negative effects of globalization but this is not in itself a 
challenge. The New Regionalism is not based on mercantile policies that try to 
protect national interests, but rather aims to increase the national role in the new 
international system by means of regionalism. This characteristic likewise 
distinguishes the New and Old Regionalisms. Moreover, the relationship between 
regional structures is also crucial for the success of regionalism. Cooperative 
relationships instead of conflicting ones will provide opportunities for regional 
initiatives. However, it is impossible to be free from the competitive nature of 
international relations. Nevertheless, conflicts will harm regional structures and will 
lead to protectionist policies. 
To sum up, regionalism has demonstrated fluctuations due to changes in the 
international system and according to the region that is analyzed. Consequently, it is 
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necessary to understand the historical evolution of regionalism in order to analyze 
instances like the Central Asian regional security structures.  
 
 
2.1.3 Theoretical Background of Regionalism 
 
Without touching upon the debate about theory, this section will provide a brief 
assessment of theories on regionalism. Such theories are divided in two parts like the 
so-called “waves” of regionalism that is the models of the Old and New 
Regionalism.  
Early debates regarding regionalism were guided by three theories: federalism, 
functionalism, and neofunctionalism.49 These theories or approaches are European-
based because they did not include a global understanding because of the fact that in 
this period, European integration alone represented a successful project of 
regionalism. However, in the New Regionalism, it is essential to have a global theory 
of regionalism. It is important to note that academic circles do not in fact adequately 
study the theoretical background of the New Regionalism. Case studies are more 
popular. For this reason, it is too soon to talk about a theory of regionalism but we 
can indicate what we should expect from it. A theory of New Regionalism cannot 
include only emerging regions. It must refer to world order in transformation and the 
emergence of a multilevel pattern of world governance. “The New Regionalism 
Theory has to explain the world order that makes processes of regionalization 
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possible or even necessary and the world order that may result from new 
regionalisms in interaction.”50   
Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw made a valuable contribution to the 
theorizing of regionalism in their books Theories of New Regionalism. In the 
introduction, Söderbaum enumerated two different categories of theories. The first 
one distinguishes theories of international relations as having either a rationalist or 
reflectivist approach. Rationalist theories are represented by neorealism or 
neoliberalism, whereas reflectivist theories cover a range of theories such as critical 
theory, post-structuralism, normative theory, historical sociology, postmodernism 
and feminism. The other system of categorization classifies theories of international 
relations as problem solving and critical, like that of Robert Cox., Söderbaum further 
explores theories of regionalism. He defines the dominant approach in the study of 
regionalism as that of rationalist problem solving with an emphasis on national 
interests, security, and regional power politics. On the other hand, the neoliberal, 
institutionalist approach places an emphasis on the role of institutions and regional 
organizations for managing interdependencies and achieving collective interests in a 
region. Neorealists put forward structural and power-oriented variables, whereas 
neoliberal institutionalists ground their assumptions on the regulating of institutions, 
particularly in intergovernmental regional organizations. Reflectivist and critical 
approaches increased their share in this discussion since the mid-1990s.51 “These 
approaches challenge core rationalist/ problem solving features, such as the 
separation of subject and object, fact and value, state centric ontology and rationalist 
epistemology. There are a large number of different critical/reflectivist theory on 
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regionalism, their common denominator is their dissatisfaction with mainstream and 
rationalist theories.”52 
 
 
2.1.4 Types of Regionalism 
 
The main subject of Old and New Regionalism was economic regionalism, 
namely trade blocs. However, with the resurgence of new regionalism there appeared 
new dimensions such as monetary regionalism, developmental regionalism, and 
security regionalism.53 
 
 
2.1.4.1 Trade Blocs 
 
The role of trade blocs in the regionalizing process is shaped by its aims. Some 
trade blocs aim to develop protectionist policies, while some trade blocs support 
integration with global trade and the development of a market economy. Under the 
New Regionalism, the generally protectionist policies of Old Regionalism were 
replaced by integrationist policies because of the necessities of the new international 
system. In this period the relations between trade blocs is crucial. For the success of a 
regionalism project, they must be cooperative rather than conflicting. 
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2.1.4.2 Monetary Regionalism 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 showed that a financial crisis could have a 
global effect in a globalized world and necessitate global responses. However, 
developing a global response is not easy. Moreover, global responses are generally 
serve the major powers and do not really take into account the circumstances of weak 
countries. Therefore, for the first time in history regional organizations outside 
Europe developed regional approaches to financial issues.54 This crisis played an 
important role in monetary regionalism. 
 
 
2.1.4.3 Developmental Regionalism 
 
Developmental regionalism means a regional grouping, which aims to enhance 
the economic complementarity of the constituent political units and capacity of the 
total regional economy.55 “Development is a multidimensional phenomenon, which 
depends on positive spillover and linkages between different sectors of an economy 
and society; it can be said to require a regional approach, whereby trade integration is 
coupled with other forms economic and factor market integration, as well as various 
types of economic cooperation in specified sectors”.56 The multidimensional and 
comprehensive structure of a regional organization is one of the main obstacles for 
developmental regionalism because developmental aims are thought to be 
insignificant and can be disregarded. Organizations that only have developmental 
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aims are seen as generally non-essential due to the fact that they are not noticeably 
successful.57 
 
 
2.1.4.4 Security Regionalism 
 
 The present thesis grounds its assumptions on security regionalism and 
mainly on Barry Buzan’s Regional Security Complex theory. For this reason, the 
next section will provide a general overview of security regionalism. 
 
 
2. 2 Regional Security 
Early debates concerning regionalism were related directly to economics. Later, 
security and peace became the main forces driving the regionalizing process. Due to 
the effects of globalization, spillover of conflict increased and this development 
forced states to cooperate in security affairs. This section will focus on Barry 
Buzan’s Regional Security Complex theory, one of the most comprehensive theories 
in regional security studies.    
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2.2.1 Security Paradigms: An Overview 
 
Man’s most basic instinct is survival, and similarly the most fundamental 
concern of the state is its survival and maximization of its interests.58 States try to 
protect themselves from any threat to their security. A state’s perception of threats 
state determines its understanding of security and in this way shapes its security 
policies. Every state has different threat perceptions, different understandings of 
security and due to this, different security policies. 
The international system is one of the most important determinants in threat 
perception and a state’s security understanding of. To this end, it is important to 
comprehend the international system that affects a state’s security policies. We can 
understand how a nation’s security understanding influences its policy with respect 
to the establishment of a “Regional Security Complex”.  
For the present argument, the distinction between Cold War and post-Cold War 
security understandings is critical. The importance of the regional level of security 
accelerated in real terms after the end of the Cold War. Although sharp differences 
exist between these periods, it is important to note that there is still certain continuity 
between them. Moreover, the rise of globalization is another factor that affected 
states’ security understanding in this period. 
During the Cold War, realism was the dominant theory and the state was the 
primary actor in the international arena. States were primarily concerned with the 
military dimension of their security. Their aim was to protect the status quo, the 
stability that nuclear deterrence and balance of terror provided.59 At that time, the 
political and conceptual framework, this simplified most issues while magnifying 
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some and obscuring others shaped security understanding. However, the most 
important characteristic of this period was a search for militarized solutions to 
problems that might have been solved through non-military means.60  
Due to the waxing and waning of the Cold War, some criticisms of the realist 
approach to security appeared in security studies. The behaviouralist movement in 
the 1950s and 1960s sought to establish a practical approach in order to solve 
conflicts and tensions between the two camps. This movement’s most significant 
contribution to international relations was the modeling of regional cooperation 
initiatives.61 Another approach, still state-centered but urging on the involvement of 
other international actors in security matters was Neorealism. This theoretical 
approach takes into account international actors other than states and encourages 
international organizations to specify some rules for the anarchic world-system. 62  
Pınar Bilgin divided the alternative ways of security thinking that emerged 
during Cold War into three categories. The first was the alternative security thinking 
that challenged the zero-sum conception of Cold War security. Peace research was 
another critical approach to security understanding, and challenged state centered 
approach of realism and gave place to individual and non-state actors. They 
introduced a very different security understanding: non-military, non-zero-sum, and 
non-violent. The third was Third World security thinking, which was critical of the 
role of domestic sources and non-military dimensions of security.63 
Although some critical approaches were formulated, realist theory continued to 
enjoy a dominant position as did state-centered and military solutions in security 
affairs. However, these emerging critical approaches were the seeds of the post-Cold 
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War system, which parted from a realist approach and led to the increase in security 
cooperation, security regionalism, and the roles accorded to actors other than states. 
However, other than the international system the globalization has vital impacts 
on states’ security understanding, in the contemporary world. The impact of 
globalization on security can be divided into three principal aspects. First, 
globalization decreased state capacity and autonomy as designated by its relative 
power vis-à-vis non-state actors, social forces, and market pressures. With its 
immense impact on state relations, globalization changed the balance of power while 
decreasing state capacity and caused a reshuffling of relative capabilities. Another 
effect of globalization was its provocation of new conflicts between states, and it is 
offering new opportunities for entrepreneurs of political violence. The costs and 
benefits of both warfare and conquest changed with the effect of globalization. This 
means the forces of globalization recast the nature of armed conflict.64 
Globalization decreased the capacity of states with respect to new security 
threats that do not acknowledge boundaries. Moreover, some new threats, such as 
environmental problems, cannot be solved by military means. The broadening of 
threats and actors complicated the security agenda and forced states to cooperate on 
security affairs. 
The end of the Cold War ended bipolar stability. The threat perception of states 
changed. In this new system, non-military factors balance the military dimensions of 
security because non-military factors are increasing in their influence on the survival 
of communities.65  
After the end of the Cold War, there appeared a need to define new security 
challenges. These new nontraditional or unconventional security challenges include 
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international terrorism, ethnic strife, environmental degradation, food and energy 
scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth, uncontrolled migration, and organized 
crime.66 
Barry Buzan divided these new, non-military security challenges into four 
groups: political, economic, environmental and societal security.67  It is important to 
note that while these problems are not new, their explicit characterization and 
treatment as security issues is a new development. Previously, only military and 
defense-related concerns shaped security agendas.68 For peace and security in the 
international system, it is important to preserve these new threats from military 
solutions. Fortunately, in the post-Cold War security understanding, military 
solutions began to lose their importance as policy options.  
Two important developments affected this process. First, developments in 
military technology have lessened the relevance of defense because borders are more 
open to external attacks and because of nuclear weapons technology. Thus, providing 
security by military means lost its meaning. Second, military means are generally 
used to press territorial aims but territory itself is losing its significance in this new 
world order.69 Furthermore, military solutions are too costly for solving non-military 
problems. The price that a state pays for a military solution should not be calculated 
in terms of economical dimension alone. It is necessary to add the cost to the social 
dimension.  
While broadening the security agenda, the new security threats challenge the 
role of state as the main actor in security affairs. In some cases, states are not willing 
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to cope with some kind of threats; in other cases, states are not able to overcome 
these threats.70 The maximization of interest is another instinct of a state as 
previously mentioned. Accordingly, states do not bother to undertake all 
responsibilities against global security threats that are not in their interest. They 
prefer to share the cost and where the cost exceeds their power, they became 
indifferent towards the issue.  
It is arguable that global problems generally need global responses. However, it 
is clear that global responses are not easy to achieve. The regional level of security 
can provide opportunities for solving new security threats peacefully. Moreover, 
regional responses are easier to attain.  
 
 
2.2.2 Regional Security 
 
Decolonization increased the hope of autonomy at the regional level of security 
but the Cold War period slowed this process with its focus on regional relations. The 
end of the Cold War accelerated this process.71  
The Cold War had an extraordinary impact on the security policies of every 
state in the world. Policy options were evaluated according to the rivalry between 
East and West. Regional options that excluded superpowers were doomed to failure. 
Even so, a Third World regionalism that generated new hopes for underdeveloped 
countries did not change the fate of regional security. 
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  Other than this impact, the Cold War had a dual effect on regional conflicts. 
On the one hand, it internationalized many conflicts. Local conflicts were considered 
to lie within superpower competition. Local combatants appealed for assistance to 
one of the superpowers or their allies. This assistance expanded conflicts as well as 
driving superpowers to provide ever-greater resources to opposing clients. On the 
other hand, due to the fear of escalation the superpowers also restrained local 
conflict. In some cases, superpowers exercised a degree of management to counteract 
increased regional tensions, keep conflicts contained, and occasionally even imposed 
settlements.72 
 However, in the post-Cold War international system, the tension between the 
superpowers was replaced by conflicts that exploded around the world. The stability 
that the bipolar system provided disappeared, and in this new system, major powers 
are generally reluctant to accept heavy burdens of conflict management in remote 
areas of the globe. In some cases, even when the cost is limited and they have long-
standing ties, they prefer to remain outside of these conflicts.73  
Barry Buzan defines three theoretical perspectives regarding the post-Cold War 
security order. The neorealist perspective based its assumptions on state and power 
polarity. The neorealist approach interprets the post-Cold War structure of 
international security as experiencing a change of power structure at the global level. 
This approach tries to understand the nature of that change in order to evaluate its 
effects on security.74  
Contrary to neorealist state-centric approach the globalist perspective, 
acknowledges the independent role of both transnational entities – corporations, non-
governmental social and political organizations of many kinds – and 
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intergovernmental organizations and regimes. This approach accepts the role of state 
but rejects the idea that states control global factors.  
This perspective approaches the security issue in two ways. On one hand, the 
idea is based on economic liberalism and considers globalization as a means to the 
steady erosion and eventual elimination of the traditional security agenda. On the 
other hand, the non-liberal perspective emphasizes the non-military areas of security. 
This perspective focused on the instability and inequality created by the liberal 
economic order. This perspective stresses the dilemma between the pursuit of 
capitalism, the sustainability of the planetary environment, and the homogenizing 
pressures of global culture while underlining the threat created by globalization to 
other cultures, languages, and identities.75  
Lastly, the regional approach has two assumptions for the post Cold War. 
Firstly, the disappearance of the East-West rivalry decreased the penetration of the 
major powers in the rest of the world. Secondly, Buzan describes the major powers 
of post Cold War period as ‘lite powers’ among which domestic pressures prevent 
their military engagement and strategic competition. This provides more room to 
maneuver for regional powers.76 
 Why do we need a regional approach in order to understand security? Global 
governance in security affairs is the target of the international community. In some 
issues, like the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the international community is close 
to this ideal. However, a universal understanding of global security is not foreseeable 
in the near future. On the way to this goal, we need a regional approach for security. 
Regional security cooperation will increase entities capacities and potentials and this 
will facilitate world peace. Regional structures necessitate regional approaches.  
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To understand national security, it is essential to analyze international security. 
National and international levels are inseparable for security. However, this 
interdependence does not necessitate binding security dynamics. Rather, a security 
dynamic would exist even if the other level did not influence it. “No one level will, 
by itself, be adequate to understand the security problem as a whole, and the full 
meaning of each will only become clear when it is seen in relation to the others.”77  
 The regional level of security plays the role of mediator between states and the 
international system.78 The regional level of security is binding for all states that 
constitute this system and this level reflects the influence of international system to 
the state. Geographical proximity is crucial for security affairs because boundaries 
have lost their meaning with the rise of globalization and threats can easily travel 
across neighboring states. 
Barry Buzan’s significant contribution to the theory of regional security, 
Regional Security Complex Theory allows an understanding the new international 
system in the Post-Cold War period and an assessment of the relative balance of 
power, and mutual relationship between regionalizing and globalizing trends.79 The 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) will be evaluated below. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Regional Security Complex 
 
Barry Buzan is an adherent of Copenhagen School of security studies. He has 
proposed a new framework for regional security studies. In this new framework, 
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Buzan challenges the traditional security approach that is state-centered and military-
based. Buzan wants to broaden the security agenda of the post-Cold War 
environment by recognizing new security challenges and new actors to 
understanding security. The importance of territory and the role of state do not 
disappear in the regional perspective. Instead, the regional security perspective is 
transitional towards a global approach. The regional approach only accepts the role 
of other actors, non-territorial perspectives, and non-military problems and solutions. 
Buzan first defined the Regional Security Complex as “a group of states whose 
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another”.80 He then 
reevaluated his definition and reformulated it as “a set of units whose major 
processes of securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another.”81 
The main determinants in the establishment of a Regional Security Complex 
are the anarchic structure of international system, geographical proximity of states 
and regional patterns of amity-enmity relations. The relationship within a RSC can 
be categorized as rivalry, balance of power, and alliance formation. This relationship 
is influenced by major powers’ policies whose penetration is critical for a RSC. A 
member of an RSC can have an alignment with a major power for balancing another 
regional power.82 Buzan argued that an RSC resembles the balance of power because 
they can exist regardless of whether or not the actors involved recognize them.83 In 
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different ways, major power penetration in the complex exists in some cases for 
balancing and in other cases for regional securitization. 
For the Central Asian states, the importance of Regional Security Complex 
Theory is that they have to acknowledge their interdependence on security issues. 
They must evaluate the impact of major powers’ penetration in their RSC. 
Accordingly, they must determine their perceptions of threats, their security 
understanding, and their security policies. Finally, hey must evaluate the role of 
cooperation inside the RSC and the role of major powers outside the complex in their 
security policies. 
 
 
2.2.4 Problems of Regional Security in Central Asia 
 
The previously mentioned changes in the international system such as the end 
of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, which influenced international and 
regional security also deeply affected Central Asia. With the end of the Cold War 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, five new states emerged in Central Asia. 
This unexpected sovereignty caught national leaders unprepared. Nearly 130 years of 
Russian rule made the establishment of an independent security and defense policy 
unrealistic immediately after the independence. Central Asian states preferred to ally 
with the Russian Federation for their security under the umbrella of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This choice was also a remedy for that 
Russian imperial pride which was broken by the disintegration of Soviet Union. 
However, early expectations were replaced by disappointments among Central Asian 
states. Despite the signing of bilateral and multilateral treaties between the Central 
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Asian states and Russia, the latter could not fulfill its responsibilities due to a lack of 
financial means and qualified personnel.  
The emergence of five new states in Central Asia also evoked international 
interest towards the region. Central Asian states disappointed by Russian 
disengagement from the region turned to states that could provide them better 
opportunities such as the USA, the Peoples Republic of China, and regional powers 
like Turkey and Iran. These developments led to the growing engagement of these 
powers in Central Asia.84 The relation between these states and Central Asia led to 
bilateral treaties and the establishment of regional cooperation organizations. 
Security structures sponsored by outside powers other than the CIS were the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the NATO Partnership for Peace 
Programme (PfP), and certain regional organizations as well. These structures and 
regional power politics remain key determinants for security in the region. Power 
politics in this context signifies relations between external powers and the Central 
Asian states and relations between the external powers themselves. Security 
structures established by external powers and by the Central Asian states are 
analyzed in the next chapter while an assessment of the role of major power policies 
in Central Asia will be examined in the fourth chapter. 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Regional Security Dynamics 
 
With respect to Central Asian security, other important determinants are 
regional security dynamics both conflicting and cooperative dynamics. Cooperative 
                                                 
84 Allison and Jonson, Central Asian Security: The New International Context, p. 3. 
 36 
dynamics prevent conflicts, motivate cooperation, and establish peaceful relations 
between Central Asian states. Meanwhile, conflictual dynamics heighten conflicts 
and tension. A distinction is to be made between internal and external dynamics.85 
Many internal and external threats complicate Central Asian security. Those threats 
could be conflictual or cooperative. The security understanding of individual Central 
Asian states determines this. This process shapes their security policies as well. 
 The engagement of external powers to Central Asia complicates internal the 
dynamics of the region. This engagement can direct the region to conflictual or 
cooperative relations. Rivalry and tension between external powers can likewise 
affect the relations between Central Asian states.86 
 Some internal threats in the region necessitate cooperative policies such as 
resurgence of Islam, problems of controlling energy and water resources, border 
problems, illegal migration, and drug smuggling. The Central Asian region inherited 
some of its internal problems from the Russian and Soviet periods. Boundaries that 
were drawn without taking into account ethnic diversity continue to cause border 
problems and tension between states. Border problems and enclaves in the Ferghana 
Valley are particularly vital for the stability of the region. The Ferghana Valley was 
transformed to a base for radical Islamist groups. Radical Islamism is one of the most 
important threats that internal and external players are concerned with. 
Other than the radical Islamist threat, porous borders of the region provide an 
opportunity for flows of insurgents, drugs, weapons, and refugees, which have 
become an acute threat to regional security. Borders that cannot be guarded 
adequately have caused tension between Central Asian states. For example, 
Uzbekistan chose unilateral policies for protecting its borders and this act has 
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increased tension between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Other than the 
Central Asian states’ weaknesses in controlling their borders, instability in 
Afghanistan has also contributed to this problem. Borders between Afghanistan and 
Central Asia could not be guarded effectively. Afghanistan remains a key player in 
the world narcotic market. Central Asian states are often used as transit counties in 
this trade.  
Ethnic diversity within each state has been a major concern of national leaders 
during the first years of the independence, but this tension only transformed into a 
conflict in Tajikistan. Tajikistan suffered from a devastating civil war during 1992-
97. This conflict threatened the stability in the region but Central Asian states, with 
the help of Russia, were able to manage the spreading effects of this civil war.87 
 
 
2.2.4.2 Regional Security Perceptions 
 
Perceptions of regional security in this region is excessively determined by 
trans-borders and trans-ethnic dynamics.88 Another security dimension to this 
regional ethnic diversity is nationalist pressure that states impose on their minorities. 
The reason for this pressure is the growing importance of ethnic identifiers for access 
to resources, be it political power or desirable standard of living.89 Pressure on ethnic 
minorities could potentially damage relations between Central Asian states. 
Furthermore, economic problems of minorities can cause instability that might 
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threaten regional security. The unstable structure of the region necessitates attaching 
importance to human rights practices for regional stability and security.   
 Other internal problems of Central Asian states, such as political pressure and 
economic problems, also pose significant dangers for the stability of Central Asia. 
The collapse of Soviet Union had a devastating effect on the economies of the 
Central Asian states. Hyperinflation and high levels of unemployment not only 
threatened the economic situation but social stability as well throughout 1990s. 
However, national leaders chose to suppress potential upheavals through political 
pressure. The economies of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan recovered 
from this stagnation thanks to their natural resources, i.e. oil and natural gas. 
However, it is not yet possible to argue for lifting of political pressure in these 
countries. 
After independence, national leaders tried to establish a national awareness and 
consolidate their nation building. Each state in the region used different paths to this 
end. The consolidation of states is essential for the stability of region. Turkmenistan 
preferred to remain aloof of regional organizations, disrupting the process of the 
creation of a Regional Security Complex. Central Asian security possesses a level of 
integrity but neutral Turkmenistan’s neutrality and to some degree, Uzbekistan 
unilateralism compromise this integrity.   
The suppression of religion during Soviet period led to interest in Islam after 
independence. Political and economic difficulties caused reactions in the public 
sphere. Dissatisfaction increased public support for radical Islamist groups in the 
region in the absence of a secular opposition. At the same time, this development 
coincided with the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan between 1994 and 2001. With 
outside support, radical Islamist groups in Central Asia increased their activities in 
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the region. The leading organizations of the radical Islamist movement in the region 
were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (later the Turkestan Islam Party) and Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Both are active in Uzbekistan and especially in the Ferghana Valley. 
Central Asian states have used every available means to suppress radical Islamism. 
Consequently, it has been argued that Central Asian leaders used this threat in order 
to justify their heavy-handed, authoritarian governments. 90 However, it is clear that 
radical Islamist movements and the terrorism that they use are primary threats to 
regional security.   
The inherited Soviet integrated economic structure has created the problem of 
sharing natural resources after the independence of the five Central Asian states.  
Energy and water resources are not abundant in this new system and these countries 
have become part of the market economy. The problematic sharing of these resources 
has increased tension in some cases. However, in 1996 a water-sharing regime was 
established between Central Asian states considered a major accomplishment. 
However, this regime excludes Afghanistan, which endangers much of the region’s 
water flow due to its lack of political stability.91  
Historical ties have connected Central Asian countries to each other and to 
Russia at the same time. During Soviet Union, infrastructures of Central Asian states 
were connected to modern Russia. In particular, Central Asian oil and natural gas are 
exported through pipelines that connect these states to Russia. It is not easy for the 
Central Asian states to break this connection and have not been able to accomplish it 
but rather have tried to diversify their customers. This development is important for 
global energy security. Energy security is one of the most important motives for the 
engagement of external powers this region’s power politics.  
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2.2.4.3 Threat Perceptions 
 
The internal dynamics of Central Asia play a fundamental role in its security 
affairs. Meanwhile, external dynamics complicate this domestic structure as well as 
regional and global power politics. It is necessary to stress that internal and external 
dynamics demonstrate that Central Asian states display integrity in their security 
affairs. These dynamics may become conflictual or cooperative due to the policy 
options of internal states. The perception and practices of individual states in the 
region will shape regional policy. A state’s threat perceptions determine its security 
and defense policies. Threats are divided into three concentric circles, one within the 
other. Domestic or internal threats are the core circle in this model. Next regional 
threats and lastly international threats comprise the two outer circles. Crucially, every 
circle’s content depends on state and region.92 In Central Asia, the security of 
regimes is the main problem in every state. However, in developed countries this is 
not an internal problem. Terrorism is an international problem for some of Western 
states, but for Central Asian states, it is both an internal problem and a regional one. 
When we look at the general picture of the Central Asian security, international 
threats have become internal or regional threats. 
As the other regions in the world, Central Asia is also deeply affected by the 
international system and the policies of major powers. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states constituted the first phase 
in the threat perception and security understanding. Meanwhile the September 11 
attacks against the United States opened a new page in the region’s security affairs. 
In addition to the change in American policies, the change of Russian policies under 
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President Putin’s administration and the increasing Chinese interest towards the 
region have also played important role in regional security. 
One of the determinants of security understanding and threat perception is 
political leadership. In this region especially, national leaders direct policymaking. 
Since independence, there have not been major changes in leaders’ mentality and 
policies throughout the region the main concern, is regime security above all, which 
generally means protection of the seat of the leader. Other problems rank second to 
regime security.  
The Central Asian states, excepting Turkmenistan, prefer to cooperate on 
security issues with major powers on a bilateral or multilateral basis. They have also 
attempted some regional initiatives but these have been relatively ineffective. The 
most important factor behind this cooperative approach is the significant lack of 
capacity to solve internal, regional, and international problems. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
SECURITY REGIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
 
After their independence, the Central Asian states were with various security 
challenges such as terrorism, radical Islamism, drug trafficking, and environmental 
problems. As mentioned before, these problems threatened their survival. To cope 
with these problems, Central Asian leaders gave impetus to bilateral and multilateral 
relations and cooperation. The Central Asian states have joined or sponsored a 
variety of regional cooperation structures. Global powers have supported security 
initiatives in order to increase their influence in the region. This chapter will evaluate 
security structures sponsored by major powers and their role in Central Asian 
security: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). In 
addition, other security initiatives sponsored by Central Asian countries are analyzed 
in the following section. 
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3.1 Regional Cooperation Structures in Greater Eurasia 
 
3.1.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
 
By signing the treaty of Minsk on 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Eight newly emerged states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined this new entity on 21 
December 1991 when they signed on to the Almaty protocol as charter members. 
Azerbaijan did not ratify the treaty in its parliament but became a member with 
Georgia later in 1993.93 With this accession, the number of members represented 
twelve out of the original fifteen successor states. The Baltic States did not join this 
organization because they valued their relations with Western states and especially 
with the European Community. 
The unexpected dissolution of Soviet Union caught the members of the CIS 
unprepared. All the successor states had different expectations from this new 
organization and from this new environment. Generally, they believed the CIS could 
provide a smooth transition to the new international system. Some countries like 
Ukraine described the CIS as a temporary institution for a civilized divorce.94 
Meanwhile, the establishment of the CIS expressed the ambitions of the Russian 
Federation, which was still the dominant power in the region. Russia imagined this 
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organization could provide the natural integration of former USSR, economically, 
politically and militarily.95  
However, some of Russia’s aims such as the preservation of economic ties with 
various parts of the former Soviet Union and the maintenance of a common security 
area for safeguarding its military power were unfeasible.96 Russian power was not 
sufficient to achieve these ambitions. On the other hand, the CIS contained diverse 
countries with different capacities and aims. For these reasons, the Russian policy of 
integration within the new CIS fluctuated according to its capabilities. 
In the beginning, Russia followed a moderate path in its foreign policy towards 
successor states. At the end of 1992, Russia announced its new Foreign Policy 
Doctrine covering its “near abroad” policy towards the new successor states. 
Although this doctrine comprised all CIS members, it had greater impact on Central 
Asian and Caucasus countries than the other CIS members. Many countries from the 
CIS and foreign powers as well perceived this declaration as a post-imperialist 
policy. This approach caused deep concern in those countries.97 
Following this declaration, Russian economic insufficiencies revealed the 
Russia’s inability to follow a multilateral policy towards its Near Abroad countries 
that could provide security and stability in those regions. Central Asia’s needs were 
extensive and Russia did not have the capacity to assume all responsibility or the 
economic burden for those problems. For this reason, Russia slowed down its 
multilateral policies and began to foster bilateral relations with these countries. 
However, after the economic recovery in the second term of President Putin, Russia 
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accelerated its multilateral relations. The extension of regional relations in Central 
Asia made significant progress for security regionalism in the region. 
Out of the fifteen independent states, which emerged after the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, twelve were members of the CIS. Different states from diverse 
areas with divergent aims and goals could not establish effective political structures. 
This divergence led to sub-regional organizations and bilateral relations within the 
CIS.98 
The USSR had a common security and defense structure, which extended all 
over the country. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, this system was dissolved 
and in general, states bordering the Soviet Union formed the substantial part of this 
structure.99 At first, some of the newly independent states were not ready for the 
establishment of a joint system while some of them consistently rejected this notion. 
Russia’s aim was to establish a common security policy and defense structure under 
the CIS umbrella. Therefore, a Collective Security Treaty was emerged. However, 
only a limited number of CIS members wanted to take part in this treaty. For this 
reason, this became a sub-regional initiative under the CIS, which was advanced and 
became an international regional organization in 2002 known as the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization. 
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3.1.1.1 Peacekeeping in CIS 
 
In December 1991, CIS heads of state decided to establish a joint command and 
signed an agreement on strategic forces. However, this goal never materialized and 
six months after the signing of the CST, the aim of creating unified armed forces 
removed from the agenda of the CIS countries as whole. Meanwhile, the CIS 
continued to take steps in security affairs especially concerning its nuclear arsenal 
and peacekeeping operations. The nuclear issue was the main problem of four 
successor states of USSR in particular. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia 
retained a Soviet nuclear arsenal even after their independence. The primary 
problems represented by this nuclear arsenal were command and control, 
proliferation, safety and storage, and the fulfillment of international disarmament 
commitments. Complete removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia was achieved 
in November 1996 and Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine became parties to the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states. A single command 
was established under Russian authority but this was open to CIS consultation.100 
Russia was eager to establish a peacekeeping force under the CIS umbrella 
because this would improve its capacity to become involved in the internal affairs of 
member states. The legal ground of peacekeeping force operations was first 
established by an agreement on military observers and collective peacekeeping on 
March 1992 in Kiev.101 Turkmenistan was not a party in this agreement and 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine accepted it with the proviso that they would evaluate every 
case individually.102 It was first used during the civil war in Tajikistan on July 1993. 
Then, in June of 1994, another peacekeeping force was established in Abkhazia. CIS 
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peacekeeping forces were withdrawn from Tajikistan in 2000 but their role in 
Georgia become complicated after Russian intervention in South Ossetia in 2008.103 
 Russia played a central role in these peacekeeping operations. In Abkhazia, 
Russia was the sole source of finance, command and personnel. In Tajikistan, Central 
Asian military units (Uzbek, Kazak and Kyrgyz) contributed to the operation.104 Two 
other peacekeeping operations were undertaken within the boundaries of CIS under 
the arrangements of Kiev Agreement. Russia signed bilateral treaties with host states 
that are with Georgia in the case of South Ossetia and with Moldova in the case of 
the Trans-Dniester Republic. Another document that extended relations in 
peacekeeping activities was the “Concept for Prevention and Settlement of Conflict 
in the Territory of Member States” of the CIS. This document aimed to broaden and 
deepen cooperation on peacekeeping within CIS area and was signed in Moscow on 
19 January 1996.105  
It is difficult to establish that the Russian role in these peacekeeping operations 
was appropriate according to international law. Neither the UN nor the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approved these operations but rather 
sent observers and humanitarian missions that meant de facto legitimization. 
Ultimately, the CIS peacekeeping mission entered a new stage after 1997. Russia lost 
its desire for military cooperation within the CIS because of internal conflicts and 
economic insufficiencies.106 
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3.1.1.2 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
 
 Military and security cooperation based on the Collective Security Treaty 
(CST) continued to develop in spite of the aforementioned events. For member 
states, the CST was an important step forward, especially regarding Central Asian 
security. In 1992, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan signed the CST in Tashkent and later, in 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia,, and 
Belarus became parties to the treaty. After its ratification, the treaty went into force 
in April 1994. Of the twelve members of the CIS, nine of them attended this new 
creation under the umbrella of the CIS.107 Only Turkmenistan in Central Asia refused 
to take part in this treaty due to its neutrality policy. 
The aim of the CST was to guarantee the fulfillment of the fundamental 
military political responsibilities that faced the newly independent republics: to 
ensure external stability in order to advance state development and to establish 
national armed forces.108 The most important feature of this treaty was that if a third 
party attacked one of the member states, signatories of the treaty would help their 
partners with every means available including military intervention.109   
The CST terminated in 1999 but the members desired its renewal except 
Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan who resigned the membership. The reason for 
this withdrawal was the perceived ineffectiveness of the organization and the 
extreme politization of its role.110 The reasons behind Uzbekistan’s withdrawal were 
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obstacles originating from Russia in armaments sales, such as supplying out-dated 
equipments or delays in delivery.111  
The withdrawal of these three countries demonstrated changes in their foreign 
policy. However, even, Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the membership, one month 
after its withdrawal, bombing in its capital; Tashkent caused a process of 
reevaluation on its relations with Russia. China and Russia backed Uzbekistan in this 
period while western countries were criticizing human rights violations. For this 
reason, Uzbekistan increased its bilateral relations with Russia in order to balance its 
relations.112 
However, even bilateral relations were increasing, Uzbekistan joined to GUAM 
that Georgia and Azerbaijan were founding members. GUAM became GUUAM after 
Uzbekistan’s accession in 1999. This organization was not regional security 
cooperation but one of its aims has been integration with Europe, especially with 
NATO on matters of security. Indeed, these countries wanted to find a new path 
apart from Russia. However, GUUAM has not been able to provide the necessary 
means for Uzbekistan’s security and Uzbekistan has subsequently withdrawn its 
membership in GUUAM. Uzbekistan renewed its membership in the CSTO in 
2006.113  
The CST was approved by all member parliaments, came into force on 20 
April1994, and was registered with the UN in 1995.114 The first and second articles 
of the new agreement were very important with respect to security regionalism. The 
first article described collective security as “the CST signatories pledged not to join 
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military alliances or any groups of states aimed against another CST member 
country.”115 Article two further emphasized collective response: “In case of a threat 
to the security, territorial integrity or sovereignty of one or several CST member 
states or a threat to international peace and security, member states pledged to use 
without delay a mechanism of joint consultations to coordinate their positions and 
implement measure to eliminate such a threat.”116 
However, even, Uzbekistan criticized CST in 1999. Uzbek leader, Kerimov 
was supporting this system when Taliban came to power. Taliban seized the control 
of Kabul in September 1996 after many attacks.117 This caused a panic in Central 
Asian states. In Troika summit118, the Russian prime minister was also attended in 
September 1996, the role of CST in Central Asian security was remembered. In this 
meeting, Kerimov played a major role.119 
Kazakh, Uzbek and Kyrgyz defense ministers decided to work mutually on 
intelligence sharing, to gather public defense structures of anti-terror and anti-
narcotics in 1996. Another structure proposed against the Taliban threat was Troika 
plus Russia but this was not a challenge to CST, this was only a specific grouping 
smaller than the general CST organization.120 
At first glance, the CST model was near to NATO, but CST was accused of 
being imprecise in conflicts among CST members and some analysts even argued 
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that there was no concrete statement concerning external threats.121 Russian foreign 
policy was evolving when the CST was established. However, Russia had taken 
mature steps after 2002 to increase integration and institutionalization.  
Russia needed the CSTO because of the US presence in Afghanistan after the 
September 11 attacks. Russia backed America in its war on terrorism in the 
beginning because this occasion legitimized its own “war on terror” inside and 
outside the Russian Federation. However, flourishing relations between the US and 
Central Asian states and widening operations in Afghanistan and Iraq disturbed 
Russia. To balance the US presence in the region, Russia gave priority to its bilateral 
and multilateral relations with Central Asian states. Multilateral initiatives increased 
and this led to the development of the CST, which then increased its role in Central 
Asian security.  
In May of 2002, the organization was renamed and reorganized. The Collective 
Security Treaty became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).122 Not 
only did the name change but also the organization’s targets were broadened in order 
to be suitable for the new security environment. The CSTO aims to be an 
international regional organization, responding effectively to terrorism, drug 
trafficking, illegal migration, organized crimes, arms smuggling, and so on. During 
this period, the organization gave priority to the institutionalization process to 
establish an appropriate framework for CSTO activities.123 
Terrorism is one of the biggest problems in Central Asian region. At the 
beginning, Central Asian states tried to find solutions under the aegis of CIS 
structures. After the attacks by radical groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999, 
Russia and Tajikistan undertook a joint military exercise with these states. The CIS 
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“Southern Shield 99” of 1999 was the first joint exercise within the CIS structure. In 
April 2000, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan established the CIS anti-
terrorism center in Russia with the support of the Russian Federal Security Service. 
In 2001, a Collective Rapid Deployment Force was formed that aims to solve 
regional crisis and to protect borders against terrorist attacks.124 
In 2003, at the leaders’ meeting in Dushanbe, six members of the CSTO 
resolved to reshuffle the organization’s structure and the creation of a joint military 
command for the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. The joint command was 
initiated in January 2004 and its headquarters is in Moscow.125 
As a response to the US-Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan and the threat of 
terrorism, Russia established an airbase in Kant in October 2003 under CSTO 
auspices. In addition, the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan 
was transformed to a permanent airbase in 2004.126 
 The cooperation between CSTO members intensified in 2004 and 2005 
especially in countering international terrorism. At the Minsk summit of June 2006, 
CSTO members decided on new proposals and resolutions. Central Asia was 
declared a nuclear weapons free zone. The CSTO leaders decided to extend 
cooperation on fighting terror and drug trafficking by signing new agreements. New 
steps were taken on the development of the CSTO’s military and economic 
components.127 In addition, a crucial development for Central Asian security was the 
readmission of Uzbekistan to the organization. 
Caspian security was another priority for Russia and the CSTO members. In 
August of 2006, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan initiated a CSTO 
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joint military exercise in order to prepare the ground for a Caspian Force (CASFOR) 
joint operational group.128 
The aims of the CSTO are to restore a unified security space and to increase its 
capacity for collective efforts in combating terrorism, extremism, and the drug 
trafficking. In order to reach these goals, the organization decided to establish its 
own parliamentary assembly in 2006. This will not only improve CSTO’s prestige 
but also will facilitate the approximation and harmonization of security legislations 
of the member-states.129 
The organization plans to establish a comprehensive system of auxiliary bodies 
and appropriate collective forces and assets in order to manage a variety of security 
threats.130 Central Asian states situated at the center of emerging global problems: 
terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and environmental degradation. 
Progress in structure and content will mostly help the securitization of the region.  
 At this time, CSTO intends to become a global international security structure 
that is capable to overcome new global security challenges. To achieve this, CSTO 
needs to improve and to strengthen the military and military-political mechanisms for 
cooperation between the member states in the sphere of national and collective 
security.131 Uzbekistan’s changing policies have complicated regional security 
cooperation but its return to CSTO strengthened the role of organization in the 
region. The Turkmen neutrality policy has also affected regional security in Central 
Asia.  
 The Establishment of a common security or foreign policy under the aegis of 
the CIS for Central Asian states and beyond is not certain. Because only their relative 
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proximity and their Soviet legacy constitute a binding force between these countries 
and this is not enough to establish a coherent institutionalized organization.  
 Indeed, despite the formal membership of Armenia and Belarus they are 
inactive members of this organization. Russia and the Central Asian countries 
display regional integrity within this organization.132 CSTO’s role with respect to the 
security affairs of the Central Asian states is significant. Only Turkmenistan, which 
decreased its membership in the CIS to associate member status, is not a member of 
CSTO. Other states in Central Asia are full members in the CIS and CSTO. With the 
rejoining of Uzbekistan to CSTO, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan create an 
internal integrity in security affairs, under the CIS structure. The acceleration of 
CSTO institutional organization and coordination on extremism, terrorism, and 
organized crime are important steps for security regionalism in Central Asia. 
 
 
3.1.2 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was built upon the Shanghai 
Five established in 1996 which aimed to solve border problems that appeared after 
the disintegration of Soviet Union among five countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. After frequent diplomatic talks, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and China reached an agreement on deepening 
military trust in border regions on 26 April 1996.133 During the meeting, these 
countries decided to deepen their relations in order to cooperate on other mutual 
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concerns and interests.134 At this meeting, participant states recognized the need for 
establishing a mechanism that would promote confidence and security in the military 
sphere within these states. In addition, they came to an arrangement that each state 
will notify each other about military exercises undertaken within 100 kilometers of 
each other’s borders.135 These were the first steps that established an international 
organization, which continued to increase its power with respect to contemporary 
international politics. 
A second meeting was held in Moscow in April of 1997. At this meeting, 
heads of states signed an “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in 
Border Regions.”136 These confidence-building measures were steps for establishing 
trust in a region that shares common interests on many different issues. Security and 
economy were two dominant problems in the region and which mutually influenced 
each other. Poverty in the region was inversely proportional to security. As a 
consequence of this environment the Shanghai Five group first paid attention to 
security and then to economic cooperation. 
In the Kazakh capital one year later in 1998, the Shanghai Five continued to 
deepen its relations appropriate to these new security concerns. In the “Almaty 
Declaration,” the group’s member states decided to cooperate in order to combat 
transnational security threats such as religious fundamentalism, ethnic separatism, 
terrorism, arms smuggling and drug trafficking, and other cross- border crimes.137 
They decided to increase economic cooperation as well.  
At this meeting, they shaped their relations and stressed that the Shanghai 
Five members would be respectful of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its 
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members. The clause of non-interference in internal affairs of members is a most 
important characteristic of the grouping.138 Members of this group criticized Western 
attitudes towards the region. In this way, Shanghai Five tried to establish a shield 
against western critics of their democracies and of human rights issues.   
The Shanghai Five leaders emphasized their wish for a multipolar world and 
for the stability of the international system.139 In the following years, the desire for a 
multipolar system played an important part in many SCO documents. Nevertheless, 
SCO members do not challenge American power. Instead of a unipolar world 
system, SCO members prefer a multipolar world with powerful international 
organizations and with an efficiently operating United Nations. These aims and 
wishes are the framework of the cooperation between these states, which became the 
basis for the SCO. They emphasize the causal relationship between cooperation and 
peace. 
In the beginning, the group was inward looking, that is their concerns were 
limited to issues such as border disputes, demilitarization, cross-border activities of 
minority groups, and economic development. However, the Alma-Ata and Bishkek 
declarations in 1999 showed signs of improving coordination on foreign policy. The 
group decided to cooperate on the threats of separatism, terrorism, and religious 
extremism that they defined as the “three evils.” Later, these threats became the 
central pillars of the founding document of the SCO. 140 
In 2000, at the meeting of heads of states in Dushanbe, President Karimov of 
Uzbekistan joined to the group as an observer for the first time. At this time, the 
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leaders decided to transform Shanghai Five to an institutionalized organization and 
named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).141 The organization was 
enlarged with the membership of Uzbekistan, and the SCO appeared on the 
international political scene on 15 June 2001.142   
In 2000, the organization decided to establish a Regional Anti-Terrorism 
Structure (RATS) at first based in Bishkek.  Then, with the inclusion of Uzbekistan, 
the group chose Tashkent instead. However, RATS could not become operational 
until 2004. RATS analyzes regional terrorist groups, shares information about 
terrorist threats and recommends on counter-terrorist policies.143 
At the Shanghai meeting that gave birth to SCO, the heads of member states 
signed the “The Shanghai Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, Separatism 
and Extremism.”144 In 2002, the charter of the organization was announced in St. 
Petersburg. In this charter, it is noted that this organization is not directed against a 
third party. The aim of the organization is defined as the respect for mutual interest 
and common approaches to deal with regional and global problems.145 SCO has 
generally been compared with NATO or the Warsaw Pact. However, it is important 
to distinguish Cold War institutions, needs, and interests from the post-Cold War 
period. Furthermore, the basic difference between these institutions is that the SCO 
does not target a third party. The aim of the organization is to increase cooperation 
within member states on the areas of security, economy, environment and culture in 
order to achieve peace, stability and prosperity. 
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The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States had profound 
effects on geo-strategic and power politics in the SCO region. The US and Western 
deployment in Central Asia and Afghanistan operation changed the balance in the 
region. American and allied forces were deployed to Manas in Kyrgyzstan and to 
Khanabad in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile Kazakhstan and Tajikistan permitted the use of 
their airspace for military flights by allied forces. Kazakhstan allowed the US the use 
of its three airports: Almaty, Chimkent, and Jambyl.146  
In the first instance, members of the SCO could not adopt a common attitude 
towards US policy because member states did not want a confrontation with the US 
and western countries. It is important to note that the major powers of the SCO, 
China and Russia, have close relations with the West that they did not want to 
jeopardize. At the same time, the ongoing American presence and the Colored 
Revolutions, especially the most recent in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 created anxiety within 
the SCO member states. Due to these developments, the SCO tightened its relations 
within the organization and fastened its institutionalization.147 Moreover, the SCO 
issued a declaration in July 2005 demanding that a final timetable be set for the use 
of Central Asian bases by international forces in Afghanistan. 
In Moscow in 2003, member states decided to institutionalize the 
organization and to establish a permanent secretariat in Beijing, which was opened in 
January 2004.148 The first secretary-general was China’s Ambassador to Russia, 
Zhang Deguang.149 This achievement, while suggesting the strengthening of the 
organization, is proof of the role of China in the organization. China has played the 
leading role in the deepening of SCO relations. For China, multilateral initiatives in 
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which it plays a crucial role should increase its position in global power politics. 
Moreover, good relations with its neighbors in Central Asia will provide to China 
security and stability in its far west, the East Turkestan region. Energy security is 
another motive that pushes China to Central Asia and Russia. 
To enhance confidence among SCO members and to coordinate a common 
military policy against potential threats, member states designed joint military 
operations firstly in 2002, in China and Kyrgyzstan, then in 2003, with all members 
participating, in China. Lastly, in 2005, Operation “Peace Mission” was held and 
Iran, India and Pakistan sent observers to the operation.150  
In 2004, Mongolia obtained observer status in the SCO and the next year 
Iran, Pakistan, and India became observers. Including observers, the SCO 
encompasses nearly half of the world’s population. Two members, China and Russia, 
and two observers, India and Pakistan, are nuclear powers. The territory of the SCO 
comprises 3/5 of Eurasia.  Russia and China are in the top three in terms of the size 
of their armed forces.151 This data shows only SCO member capabilities but act 
together is not a function of capability. It is more likely connected with the 
willingness of member states and the situation in international system.   
The Central Asian members of the SCO are in a period of transition to 
democracy and a market economy. During this painful period, the SCO clause of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and sovereignty protect those countries from 
western critics. However, the economic and social problems in Central Asia also 
threaten security in the SCO region. For this reason, the SCO should improve 
economic cooperation by influencing the domestic social and political situation in 
member states without violating its non-interference principle. Due to these 
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necessities, at the Astana summit in July 2005, the SCO specified its intend to work 
more actively in strengthening Central Asian stability and economy to oppose new 
challenges and threats to international and regional stability for creating conditions 
conducive to sustainable development and to eradicate poverty.152 
At the Shanghai summit of 2006, member states underscored their 
determination regarding the continuation of mutually advantageous economic 
cooperation in the SCO’s “Declaration of Five Years”.153 Energy resources are the 
trump card in the hands of Central Asian states. Their energy resources give them 
advantages in economic cooperation within SCO countries. Energy security has 
become vital in the globalized world for every industrialized country. In order to 
coordinate energy strategies and strengthen energy security, Russia proposed an 
“Energy Club” that will unite energy producers and consumers, transit countries, and 
private companies. On 3 July 2007, the Energy Club was established in Moscow.154 
Increasing cooperation in the energy sector is a valuable step for Central Asian 
security. Stability, peace, prosperity, and security are closely interconnected to each 
in this area.    
The SCO is a new type of cooperation that appeared due to needs of the new 
global system. In some instances, the effects of the September 11 attacks were 
excessively exaggerated. However, it is clear that it was evidence for the necessity of 
cooperation in solving global problems. Unilateral actions are not adequate and 
disturb other countries. The old type of regionalism, exemplified by the European 
Union, is identity-based and dictates liberal democratic values. However, SCO that 
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espouses the new regionalism is a functional, interest-based cooperation, which take 
measures against the negative effects of globalization.155  
The SCO is based on “Shanghai Spirit” that means for SCO members, 
principles of mutual trust, benefit, and equality.156  The most important characteristic 
of the SCO is that it is not an alliance but rather a partnership. It does not target a 
third party while aiming at multipolar world order. The main “enemies” of the 
member states are extremism, separatism, and terrorism. Moreover, their guiding 
principal is the non-interference in internal affairs. 
The membership of Russia and China is the most important advantage for the 
Central Asian countries. As a result, these two major powers can balance each other 
in the organization. There will not be a dominant power that dictates its agendas. 
Although, Chinese and Russian military capacity seems to be a threat for Central 
Asian region, they are major supporters of peace and stability in Central Asia. These 
two nuclear major powers have the capacity and the tool to change the geo-politic 
and geo-economic competition in the region to a peaceful approach.157  
Every characteristic of SCO anticipates its aim to establish a multipolar world 
order. In a multipolar world, international organizations will increase its importance 
and superpowers will not dictate the agenda to regional powers. This will increase 
stability and security in Central Asia. The SCO is an important player in the security 
and economy in Central Asia. This type of organization is appropriate for the current 
structure of the region. The leadership in Central Asia supports SCO because this 
provides a basis for the security of existing regimes.  
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3.1.3 NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
 
          All Central Asian states are NATO PfP partners, including Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan since 1994 and Tajikistan 
since 2002. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) seeks to provide cooperation between 
NATO member states and NATO partners. In this way, partners establish bilateral 
relations with NATO in order to cooperate according to their own security priorities. 
With PfP, NATO members desire to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace, 
and to support security relationship between partners and members.158 
 NATO PfP was designed to adopt NATO to the new international system after 
the end of Cold War. After the disappearance of Soviet threat, NATO ‘s raison d'être 
began to be questioned. The defense organization lost its adversary but a short 
interlude demonstrated that the NATO members were still not secure in a world 
without the Soviet Union. New security threats entered the agenda of NATO. 
Moreover, the most important effect of globalization on security was that the new 
threats do not recognize borders in the contemporary international system. As a 
result, the security around NATO members’ boundaries became crucial and so 
NATO established the Partnership for Peace in January 1994 during the Brussels 
summit.159 
 PfP does not anticipate a multilateral base for cooperation. Rather it provides 
a bilateral relationship between partners and NATO members. This program cannot 
provide a security guarantee to its partners but it ensures measures for confidence 
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building, preventive diplomacy, and coordination for new security challenges.160 
Moreover, one should note that, this program aims to facilitate the process of 
transition to democracy and market economies in partner states.161 
   The basis of the relationship was designated in the framework document that 
determines comprehensive commitments for each Partner country: 
To preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international 
law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and 
arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. 
Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national 
defense planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed 
forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.162 
 
  The allies also give assurance that they will consult with any partner country 
if there is a direct threat towards its territorial integrity, security, or political 
independence.163 The NATO PfP program does not provide mechanisms for 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in Central Asia. However, NATO 
encouraged Central Asian partners for the establishment of Central Asian Battalion 
(Centrasbast) under the umbrella of the Central Asian Economic Community 
(CAEC). Centrasbat is not a NATO PfP program. The reason for this potential 
confusion is that some bilateral relations of NATO members were maintained as 
NATO PfP activities. NATO accepts these pure bilateral assistances as programs “In 
the spirit of PfP.”164 
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Since 1997, NATO has continued to develop its relations with the region 
through military exercises under Centrasbat and through training assistance. To this 
end NATO established a PfP center for military training in Turkey to train military 
personnel from Central Asian states.165 However, the region’s importance increased 
after American operations in Afghanistan commenced and especially after the NATO 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took control in Afghanistan in 
2003.166 
Central Asian partners have supported the US and NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. Uzbekistan has provided airbases for flights of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF. Kyrgyzstan supported ISAF and Kazakhstan 
gave support to Poland for demining operations in Iraq and gave the permission for 
over flight and the transport of supplies through its territory. Moreover, in this 
period, USA established air bases in Uzbekistan (Khanabad) and in Kyrgyzstan 
(Manas). 167 
The NATO PfP does not promise future NATO membership to its partners in 
Central Asia. Ten partners of the PfP program have become NATO members but the 
remaining partners are either not interested or not likely to enter the alliance.168 For 
Central Asian countries with the possible exception of Kazakhstan, which has 
deepened its relationship with NATO, to become a member of NATO is a distant 
dream. Consequently, this program is not currently promising for Central Asian 
states in their struggle with the new security challenges. The NATO PfP program has 
increased coordination between Central Asian states and NATO but this is not a 
                                                 
165 Amanov, p. 282. 
166 Amanov, p. 289. 
167 Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era”, US Foreign Policy 
Agenda, Vol. 9, No.2, June 2004, p. 33. 
168 Simon, p. 28. 
 65 
practical force for solving regional problems. The PfP can be only the first step in the 
relationship between NATO and its Central Asian partners.  
The relationship between the Central Asian states and NATO was established 
on a bilateral basis. In fact, these relationships show variations from country to 
country in the region. Therefore, the NATO PfP program does not enhance 
regionalism initiatives in the region. The real contribution of this program is to 
improve regional development in security by its training programs and to increase 
coordination between Central Asian partners and NATO members. The NATO PfP 
and especially the US support democratic initiatives and market economies in 
Central Asia. However, NATO carefully abstains itself from criticizing Central 
Asian states about their domestic problems.   
The future success of the relationship between NATO and the Central Asian 
states under the PfP program depends on the NATO’s capacity to adopt its structure 
to an enlarging area and to new the security challenges of the 21st century. To be 
effective, NATO has to transform itself. It has to redefine its priorities and calibrate 
its budget according to these priorities. NATO PfP should focus on the development 
of capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats by enforcing 
bilateral and especially regional initiatives. 169 
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3.2 Central Asian Regional Cooperation Structures 
 
This section will focus on four structures: the Central Asian Economic 
Community (CAEC), Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and Central Asian 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). 
 
 
3.2.1 The Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC)  
 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan formed Central Asian Economic 
Community (CAEC) in 1994. This organization had some security targets in addition 
to economic goals, such as to resolve water management, combat drug trafficking, 
and to increase military and security cooperation.170 CAEC decided to establish joint 
Council of Defense Ministers for regional security and defense coordination, 
including the coordination of military exercises, air defense and defense supplies. 
Centrasbat was created at this time.171 As mentioned above, Centrasbat is not an 
initiative sponsored solely CAEC. However, has received the support of the NATO 
PfP program as well.   
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participate in the Centrasbat series 
of exercises in order to improve interaction on peacekeeping or humanitarian 
operations and exercising command, control, and logistics within a multinational 
framework. Tajikistan joined Centrasbat in 1998. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, United 
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Kingdom, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia also participate in some of the 
activities of Centrasbat.172 In Central Asia, only Turkmenistan remained outside this 
organization. This was not an obstacle to its being a purely regional organization 
because Turkmenistan was following a policy of neutrality in its foreign affairs. 
             The function of Centrasbat is undetermined but in addition to military 
assistance, the NATO PfP program provides Central Asian states with the tools to 
balance the role of Russia in the region.173 
Centrasbat military exercises continued from 1997 to 2000.  These occasions 
have also had practical importance for NATO in that they test in practice their 
theoretical calculations for a military operation in the region and provide intelligence 
about local conditions, logistical lines, and terrain.174 
The main regional problems, Islamic resurgence and terrorism, were 
weakening all members of CAEC and were damaging relations between them. These 
threats were increasing suspicion among the Central Asian countries. In 2000, CAEC 
leaders signed an agreement on cooperation in fighting terrorism, extremism, and 
trans-border organized crime. However, initial expectations gave way to the seeking 
of new partners in solving regional problems after the incursion of armed Islamist 
groups into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the summer of 2000. Depending on that, 
four CAEC leaders appealed to Russia to join to their agreement and to the CIS 
Collective Security Council to plan action for countering the terrorist threat.175 In 
2001, Kerimov declared that the stability of a state in Central Asia is dependent on 
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the stability of other Central Asian states. In this period, security concerns started to 
replace economic concerns that were the driving force in the CAEC.176 
 
 
3.2.2 Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) 
 
In 2001, CAEC altered its structure and became the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization (CACO). On paper, this arrangement intended to increase 
cooperation but the overall record of effective cooperation during 2002-2004 
decreased with respect to economics, trade, and security affairs. The president of 
Uzbekistan Islam Karimov called upon Russia to be a member of CACO in order to 
solve problems within the member states. In 2004, Russia became a member in 
CACO.177 This was the end to regional initiatives without an external partner. This 
development also demonstrated the changing role of Russia regarding the Central 
Asian countries. After the September 11 attacks, the Central Asian states were 
impressed by Western engagement in the region and they wanted to balance Russia’s 
role through fostering Western involvement. However, this call for Russian 
membership shows that Russia remained the most important determinant in regional 
security calculations. 
Nevertheless, Russia was not ready to become deeply involved in the intricate 
disputes between Central Asian states. Russia pushed CACO members to merge with 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). The merger was declared in October 
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2005 and the reason for this merger was declared a move to rationalize two 
institutions with largely overlapping goals.178 
After this failure of a purely regional structure, Kazakh leader Nazarbayev 
introduced new proposals on the regional level. In 2001, he proposed a single space 
in Central Asia that would create an area of prosperity, to prevent international 
terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Then, in 2005, 
he suggested the revival of the historical aim of the Central Asian Union. However, 
these proposals did not materialize because of disagreements between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan.179 Kazakh leader, Nazarbayev underlined in a speech in 2005, the 
necessity of “United States of Central Asia” for the economic development of the 
region that will increase stability, security, economic and military independence. 
Currently, his support to this idea and to this initiative continues.180 
The most important barrier to regional structures in this area has been the lack 
of resources to solve huge internal and external problems. Conflicts between Central 
Asian states prevent regional cooperation without an external party as well. 
Competition especially between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is the main obstacle. 
Kerimov rejected the initiatives backed by the Kazakh leader due to this competition. 
Kazakhstan is the largest country in the region while Uzbekistan’s population is 
close that of the remaining four countries in the region combines. This competition is 
also obvious in their relations with major powers. There are various problems 
between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan too. However, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan are weak states lacking resources. They support cooperative initiative in 
regional level in order to solve their problems. 
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3.2.3 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA) 
 
Other than purely Central Asian security structures, there are some initiatives 
that have arisen from the Central Asian region such as the Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). President Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan initiated this international security forum in 1992. Nazarbayev’s aim was 
to erect an effective and universal security system in Asia. An organization that other 
regions had already acquired was lacking in Asia.181 CICA’s broad membership 
includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Jordan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Palestinian National Authority, Pakistan, 
Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and 
Uzbekistan. The UN, OSCE, League of Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Qatar, Vietnam, Ukraine and USA have observer status in these periodic meetings.182 
CICA covers a huge geographical area comprising different cultures, 
ethnicities, and religions. Nearly half of the world’s population lives in this zone, 
whose economic leverage increases day by day. On one hand, , there are developing 
countries in this region whose energy needs increase continuously, and on the other 
hand, major energy providers are likewise members of CICA. Security in this area is 
essential for development, and so CICA took the OSCE success in Europe as an 
example in preventive diplomacy and disarmament. Like the OSCE, CICA tries to 
strengthen measures for preventing conflict and confidence building in the Central 
Asian region and its neighbors. 183 
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 CICA stresses disarmament and aims to sanitize some areas of nuclear 
weapons. Another threat to security that CICA considers important is instability. 
CICA has also tried to establish the necessary dialog between civilizations and 
religions. Lastly, the biggest problem of the region is also on the CICA’s agenda, 
terrorism and the future of Afghanistan.184 
Two summits were held in 2002 and 2006 and three ministerial meetings in 
1999, 2004 and 2008. The aim of these quadrennial meetings is to conduct 
consultations, review the progress of CICA activities, and set priorities for the 
future..185 
The Almaty Act that was issued in 2002 is CICA’s first step of towards 
becoming an international organization. However, it is too soon to talk about the 
success of this forum. Broad membership complicates the system but the forum will 
serve to build confidence between member states. This initiative is helpful for 
Central Asian security overall. 
 
 
3.2.4 Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ) 
 
Another cooperation functioning in Central Asia is the initiative to form a 
dialogue for a Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ). In 1993, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan proposed this idea in a session of the UN assembly. 
Despite Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, this initiative compromises all five states 
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in the Central Asian region. China and Russia are also informally engaging in the 
process.186 
Some proposals of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan proved fruitless from 1994-
1996. In 1997, the five leaders of Central Asian states signed the Almaty 
Declaration. Leaders met again in 2002, and in 2005, the final draft of CSNWFZ was 
signed.187 This treaty forbids signatories to conduct research on, develop, 
manufacture, stockpile, or otherwise acquire, possess, or control over any nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device.188 This treaty serves mainly to build 
confidence between Central Asian states. The membership of Turkmenistan is 
especially meaningful for regional security. Indeed, although this treaty is not really 
effective because CSTO members; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan are protected under the Russian nuclear umbrella, it contributes to 
regional security.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
GLOBAL POWERS IN CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL 
SECURITY 
 
4.1 The Russian Role in Central Asian Security 
 
 Since the disintegration of Soviet Union, two different schools of thought 
have shaped Russian foreign policy. The Euro-Atlanticist perspective based its 
assumptions on western values and western forms of development. This perspective 
stresses the importance of partnership with the US and the Europe. This approach 
requires a closer security relationship with the West rather than a cooperative policy 
in the Persian Gulf or Southwest Asian region. As for Central Asian security, this 
perspective favors a western approach, which characterizes Russia as an agent of 
containment on behalf of the Western world against Asian security threats.189 The 
Euro-Atlanticist perspective intends to break the historical ties that connect Central 
Asia to Russia which entail certain responsibilities. According to this understanding, 
Russia could only achieve its development if it turns to the West and its role should 
be to secure the Western world from Asian threats. 
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On the other hand, the neo-Eurasianist perspective is established on the 
assumption that the success of reform in Russia toward its reassertion of Russian 
statehood and the recovery of lost ground after the collapse of the Soviet Union.190 
This approach rejects unipolar world stability and encourages Russia’s role in world 
affairs. Neo- Eurasianists advocate bilateral and multilateral security initiatives led 
by Russia generally in the CIS region, but particularly in Central Asia. 
Russian foreign policy immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union 
demonstrated sharp inclinations towards a Euro-Atlanticist perspective. At this time, 
Russia’s primary aim of in foreign affairs was to reorganize relations with the West. 
The CIS, especially the Central Asian states were seen as a burden to the devastated 
Russian economy, which was. Confusion and disengagement characterized Russian 
foreign policy towards Central Asia in the aftermath.191 
 In mid 1992, Russian foreign policy changed its approach toward the CIS 
countries. Russia tried to find a balance between Euro-Atlanticist and Neo-
Eurasianist perspectives in foreign policy. Following this shift, Russia announced a 
new framework of its foreign policy towards Central Asia in its Near Abroad Policy 
in April 1993. Even after signing the Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, all 
Central Asian countries chose to enhance their relations with Russia on bilateral 
bases by series of friendship treaties.192  
Many different dynamics affect foreign policy options. Leadership and 
internal dynamics are very important but this chapter only examines the most 
significant changes. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Russia continued to 
follow the strategy of Mikhail Gorbachev. This strategy was rested upon three 
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pillars: economic and political reforms, international cooperation, and a 
rapprochement with the West.193 This understanding alienated Russia from Central 
Asia and was criticized by the Russian military after the emergence of conflicts in 
the CIS region. Russia’s reluctance to intervene changed and in 1993 the Near 
Abroad policy for CIS countries was introduced. 
 
 
4.1.1 Near Abroad and Russia as a Great Power 
 
Russia returned to the use of great power rhetoric and rejected any other 
structure than CIS in this region. In Central Asia, Russia began to play a zero-sum 
game.194 At this time, bilateral and multilateral relations increased between the 
Central Asian states and Russia. However, in 1996 the gap between Russian 
ambitious policies and its capacity became clear. Russian economic and political 
power was not enough to make it a military and economic integrator and guarantor of 
security in former Soviet territory. Consequently, Russia decided on a more 
pragmatic and low profile policy in order to diminish the gap between policy 
declarations and actual capability.195 
It is necessary to define divergences in Russian foreign policy within the CIS 
region. After its disintegration, Russia withdrew politically, economically and 
militarily from Eastern Europe, the Baltic, and the western CIS states. Military 
cooperation was not on the agenda, but rather economic cooperation especially in the 
energy sector became prominent in its relations. However, in Central Asia Russia 
                                                 
193 Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy, (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 5. 
194 Cafersoy, p. 166. 
195 Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shapping of Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 5-6. 
 76 
wanted to maintain a role as a security guarantor and a leader in economic 
integration. Central Asia was defined as part of the Russian sphere of influence.196 
Russia’s biggest fear in the Central Asian region was that its disengagement would 
lead to a power vacuum, which might be filled by a state unfriendly to Russia.197  
Two important incentives pushed Russia into the Central Asian region: first, 
strategic concerns about the growing engagement of foreign actors in this region, and 
second, the increasing concerns over regional security that threatened greater 
Eurasian security. Economic concerns are inscribed within all these motives.198 The 
threat of the spread of radical Islamism into Central Asia was one of Russia’s major 
security concerns. The civil war in Tajikistan gave rise to this fear. The war between 
local Tajik clans separated the country between the Communist and democratically 
backed Islamists. Russia feared the toppling of secular governments in a domino 
fashion if Islamists in Tajikistan came to power. 199 
Inter-clan conflict in Tajikistan did not expand in the region and the Russian 
concern shifted to another issue, drug trafficking.200 The permeable borders of 
Central Asia provided an opportunity for drug dealers coming from Afghanistan to 
Europe using Central Asian states and Russia as transit countries. In the mid-1990s, 
Russia suggested the concept of a “double border” between the CIS and Russia, 
which would generate a forward security barrier along the old Soviet border with 
Iran and Afghanistan. However, this suggestion never materialized.201 Central Asian 
countries insisted on independent policies on border problems. Only Tajikistan 
accepted Russia’s help in order to control its borders and to train its border staff.  
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Border control is a major security problem for Russia because Russia and 
Kazakhstan have the longest extant continuous land border, and is not monitored. 
Except for a few check points and customs offices along the major roads, there is no 
real barrier from Afghanistan until Russia. This causes problems in controlling 
illegal migration, drug trafficking, and other forms of smuggling.202 
 
  
4.1.2 The Taliban, IMU and Russian Foreign Policy 
 
 The Taliban took the control of Afghanistan in 1996 and this increased 
security concerns in Central Asia. This event increased Central Asian expectations 
from Russia concerning their security. However, Russia was also experiencing a 
separatist uprising in Chechnya and Russia had to accept the de facto independence 
of Chechnya until 1999.203 Another internal problem was the Russian economy that 
had been devastated in 1998. Due to internal problems, Russia could not respond 
effectively to the demands of Central Asian countries until 1999 when Vladimir 
Putin came to power. 
 The 1990s were the period of Russian disengagement from Central Asia and 
this power vacuum in the region was gradually replaced by other powers. At this 
time, Russia failed to establish a coherent strategy towards the region encompassing 
the full complex of military, economic, political, and humanitarian spheres.204 
Russian foreign policy underwent many policy shifts during the presidency of 
Putin. During this period, Russia solved some of its internal problems and increased 
                                                 
202 Trenin, p. 126. 
203 Trenin, p. 122. 
204 Boris Rumer, Central Asia at the End of the Transition, (New York: M. E Sharpe, 2005), p. 73. 
 78 
its capabilities.  The problem of Chechen separatism was suppressed and was 
partially solved. In 2000s, Russia witnessed considerable economic growth due to 
increasing energy prices and due to its growing role as a supplier in the energy 
sector. Domestic opposition was silenced under Putin’s strict rule. 
 In 1999, the IMU under Juma Namangani (its military leader) made 
incursions into the Batken region in southern Kyrgyzstan from bases in Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan and took hostages, including four Japanese geologists. The events in 
Batken and the Chechen attack on Dagestan in 1999 shaped Russian foreign policy 
towards Central Asia. These events paved the way for improving military and 
security cooperation between the Central Asian states and Russia.205 The Batken 
events and the Chechen problem allowed Russia to adopt rhetoric of terrorism. One 
of the main determinants in foreign policy became the threat of international 
terrorism.   
 In this period, President Putin gave priority to relations with Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the CST but responded positively to Russian 
proposals for cooperation and a series of bilateral agreements on security and 
military technical cooperation. President Putin described relations with Uzbekistan as 
a ‘strategic partnership’.206 
 For Russia during this period, the best option to improve relations with other 
Central Asian states was a collective option because Russian capabilities were not 
sufficient to provide bilateral guaranties to all Central Asian states. The Russian 
economy was recovering from the recent effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1998 
and the increase in energy prices in 2000. This recovery helped Russia to apply its 
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foreign policy towards Central Asia. Russia’s collective efforts of were mentioned 
under the CIS title. 
 The September 11 attacks were of significance for Central Asian politics. The 
US declared “war on terrorism” and targeted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
which supported Al-Qaeda. The Taliban was a security concern for Russia and 
Central Asian states ever since it came to power in 1996. In Central Asia, only 
Turkmenistan engaged in relations with Afghanistan.207  
 
 
4.1.3 The September 11 attacks and Central Asia 
 
Four years prior to the September 11 attacks Russia had established a base in 
Tajikistan for supporting the anti-Taliban Northern Coalition, supplying weapons 
and materials to Ahmed Shah Masoud’s Tajiks and Abdul Rashid Dostum’s 
Uzbeks.208 However, Russian capabilities were not enough to remove Taliban from 
power. Operation Enduring Freedom, initiated by the US and western allies, fulfilled 
its mission but the role of Russia was also crucial to this operation.  
After a period of assessment, President Putin announced Russian support for 
the war on terrorism. In a declaration on 24 September 2001, Putin proposed to 
cooperate through special services in exchanging intelligence and opening Russian 
airspace for transit flights carrying humanitarian assistance. Russia increased its 
support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and backed the decision of the 
Central Asian states to make their airfields and military bases available for the use of 
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the US military. Lastly, Putin declared Russian support for search and rescue 
missions.209 
Russian assistance in the operations in Afghanistan was meaningful for world 
affairs and particularly for Central Asian politics. In this way, Russia demonstrated 
that its policy of seeking integration and cooperation with the West was irrevocable. 
Russia’s action was pragmatic. This decision shows a determination to restore 
Russia’s position in its traditional spheres of influence.210 Central Asian countries, 
especially Uzbekistan, were foremost advocates of the US position. Russian support 
preserved the relations between Central Asian countries and Russia. Another motive 
for Russia’s support of for the US operation was the Russian war in Chechnya, 
because the US decreased its pressure on Russia with regard to its internal problems. 
Russia started to use the rhetoric of “war on terrorism” with respect to Chechnya.  
The US operations in Afghanistan increased the importance of Central Asia in 
world politics. The Central Asian states, especially Uzbekistan, acquired the chance 
to diversify their security partnerships. Moreover, the IMU suffered a devastating 
defeat in battles around Mazar-i-Sharif in November 2001.211 
At the end of the 2001, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan opened their territories to 
the US army and the United States established airbases in these countries. Russia did 
not oppose this development but hoped that this presence will be a temporary 
presence within the framework of anti-terrorist operations.212 Russian concerns were 
observed in meetings of multilateral security initiatives in which they demanded 
along with China a timetable for the withdrawal of the US from Central Asia.  
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 The increasing US presence and influence in Central Asia forced Russia to 
return to the region, which occurred along three axes: the establishment of military 
bases, active efforts within the framework of multilateral security organizations, and 
the development of bilateral interstate military and security relations.213 
 Russia opened its military base in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003 close to 
Manas airport where US forces were deployed.214 Russia signed a 15-year agreement 
for the use of the Kant airbase as a part of the CIS Collective Security Rapid 
Reaction Force.215 Russia increased its efforts toward the institutionalization of SCO 
and CSTO. Russia supported these organizations in their restructuring for becoming 
attuned to the new international environment and to the new security threats. 
Moreover, Russia started to revise its bilateral relations with Central Asian states, 
especially with Uzbekistan, which was deteriorated after US engagement in the 
region. Thus, Russia signed a “Treaty on Strategic Partnership” with Uzbekistan in 
June 2004. The aim of the treaty was the development of cooperation in the military 
sphere.216 In June of 2004, Russia also reached an agreement with Tajikistan and this 
agreement converted Russia’s existing military deployment into a permanent base.217 
 The US operation in Iraq was one of the reasons why Central Asian countries 
became suspicious about the US intentions in the region and returned to view Russia 
as a reliable partner. Even though they supported the US operation in Iraq by way 
showing their loyalty to their partner, the Central Asian countries started to question 
the agenda of the US.218 This was a good opportunity for Russia. In this period, 
Russia increased its capacity for playing a major role in the region but it was still 
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impossible for Russia to solve all the problems of the region. Therefore, Russia 
stressed multilateral cooperation and for Russia, China was preferred as an ally to the 
US in the regional context. 
 
 
4.1.4 Russia, the US and Central Asia 
 
 Russia not only increased its relations in security affairs but also paid greater 
attention to the economic aspects of its relations with Central Asian states. Energy 
especially became an issue of security was centered on the agenda of relations.219 
Russia started to use energy as a tool in its foreign policy.  Energy resources, 
especially oil and natural gas, become political levers because the prices in energy 
market rose steadily.220 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan held energy 
resources in the energy game. They were landlocked and needed Russia for the 
transportation of their resources. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were small countries in 
need of energy. For Russia, the main problem was to prevent alternative routes that 
would bypass Russia and that will challenge its historical role. Russia signed treaties 
with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for twenty-five years to transport the 
majority of the energy produced from these countries. This development is a real 
indicator of the role of Russia in the region.  
  Developments in the US-Russian relations in Central Asia were hampered by 
two important events. First, the “Colored Revolutions” that flourished in the CIS 
region increased the tension between these countries. Meanwhile, these revolutions 
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changed the foreign policy of the Central Asian countries to strengthen their relations 
with the US in the aftermath of September 11. Especially after the Tulip Revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan that overthrew President Askar Akayev in 2005, and the “Colored 
Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, which followed, Uzbekistan began to feel 
threatened. At this juncture, the Andijan events of May 2005 were harshly 
suppressed by the Karimov regime. China and Russia backed Uzbekistan in its 
actions while the US after some hesitation called for an international inquiry into the 
events in Andijan, as did the EU. Uzbekistan immediately demanded the US 
evacuate the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base in Uzbekistan because of the critical stance 
of the US on the Andijan events. 221 The US departure from the K2 base coincided 
with an intense rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia.222 This improvement 
was interpreted as the escalation of competition between the US and Russia for 
Central Asia.  
Second, Russian operations against Georgia in August of 2008 changed 
strategic understandings in the region. Since the Rose Revolution, which brought the 
young, Western-oriented leader Saakashvili to the head of the government, Russian-
Georgian relations became tense. Russia warned the Georgian leader because of his 
pro-Western actions such as advocating Georgian candidacy for membership in 
NATO and the EU. For Russia, these actions challenged Russia’s regional role. In 
August of 2008, Russia began operations in two separatist regions of Georgia, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a response to Saakashvili’s attempt to reintegrate these 
separatist regions. Russia’s action was seen as a punishment for Saakashvili’s 
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government for its western orientation and its alienation from Russia.223 The US and 
the West criticized Russia for its operation and its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent states. However, the most important impact of this 
operation to the Central Asian region was the increased fear of Russian imperialism, 
but this did not lead to a setback between the Central Asian states and Russia 
Within the CIS, the Central Asian states are weak in terms of economy and 
political stability. Generally, they are close allies of Russia because of their security 
and economic needs. The Georgian operation was a show of force to the Central 
Asian states that were searching for Western allies to balance Russia. The Colored 
Revolutions estranged the Central Asian states from the US. Meanwhile, the 
Georgian operation increased Central Asian fear of Russia’s reaction if they wished 
to increase their relations with the West.  
Internal security threats like the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May of 
2005 and the upheavals in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and November 2006 demanded 
that Russia pay greater attention to the region.224 Possible anti-regime upheavals in 
the region endangered stability, a national security interest for Russia. Central Asian 
leaders sought after Russia as the best option for their regime security. Roy Allison 
described this type of protective integration as “virtual regionalism.” According to 
Allison, this is a form of collective political solidarity with Russia to prevent the 
influences of international political process or agendas, which challenge regional 
political leaders and their regimes.225 
The role of Russia in Central Asian security cannot be underestimated. Russia 
is the major external player in Central Asian security affairs. On the one hand, 
historical ties and the current international system forced Russia to assume the role of 
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integrator in the region. On the other hand, Russian national interests necessitate 
engagement with the Central Asian security because the stability in the region is vital 
for Russia. Because of its inadequacies, Russia cannot take on the entire burden of 
Central Asian security. Russia supports multilateral initiatives in order to share the 
burden of solving security problems. Russia prefers the CIS structure and particularly 
the CSTO for Central Asia. However, Russia also supports the SCO structure is as an 
alternative. Security regionalism accelerates with Russian assistance. However, this 
assistance is a pragmatic approach that Roy Allison termed virtual regionalism. 
Nevertheless, Russian support of regionalism had increased stability and security in 
the region.  
  
 
4.2 The US Role in Central Asian Security 
 
The five Central Asian states, which had emerged after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, attracted world attention because Central Asia had been closed to outside 
world during the Soviet rule. The mysterious region had attracted some attention but 
it remained a low priority in US foreign policy throughout the 1990s. The September 
11 attacks were a turning point in the relationship between Central Asian states and 
the US. The US increased its security relationship with the region in order to support 
its operation in Afghanistan. Another motivating force that drove the US towards the 
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region was increasing energy prices. For energy security, the US turned to the 
region’s resources to diversify its energy imports.226 
US foreign policy towards Central Asia was not specifically regional but was 
a part of a larger foreign policy understanding towards the former Soviet States. The 
US has supported democratic, market-oriented reforms, encouraged their rapid 
integration into international political, economic, and security institutions, promoted 
conflict resolution and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
forwarded U.S. business interests in the new republics.  The goal of US policy in the 
successor states of USSR has been to promote the rise of peaceful, stable and 
democratic states.227 
At the beginning of 1990s, the US foreign policy was focused on the Gulf 
War, the future of NATO, peace in Middle East, and ethnic problems in Balkan 
region. In the US foreign policy, these regions and Russia took priority over Central 
Asia.228 During this period, the US encouraged Turkey to assume an important role 
in this region as a key US ally. The US wanted Turkey to assume a central role in the 
transportation of Caspian energy to western markets as a bridge between the west 
and the southern republics. Another reason for the US support for Turkey was the 
fear of Iranian influence in Central Asia.229 Although the US has backed a Turkish 
role in Central Asia, the US continued to have a “Russia First” policy and it was 
careful not to estrange Russia with its foreign policy.230 
However, the declaration of Russian “Near Abroad” policy, the ineffective 
policies of Turkey, the increasing interest of other external powers, and the demand 
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of American energy markets pushed the US to revise its foreign policy towards the 
Central Asian states.231 Caspian energy resources and their accessibility became a 
national interest for the US after the mid-1990s. Under the effect of this concern, the 
US-Central Asian relationship developed on the basis of a economics and trade. In 
1998, the White House identified in the National Security Strategy paper 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic- political reforms in 
Central Asia as in the American national interest. This paper underscored the 
importance of Central Asian politics for stability and security in the entire Asia.232 
American energy companies were seeking access to the region’s oil and gas 
resources while the US administration was supporting independence, sovereignty, 
and stability in the region.233  
Even though the US did not develop any coherent strategy and practices 
towards Central Asia during 1990s, it encouraged Central Asian states to become 
members of OSCE, NATO, and other western international organizations.  The US 
backed Central Asian states in cooperation with NATO by Partnership for Peace 
program as well.234 
 
 
4.2.1 Democracy, Uzbekistan and the US 
 
The relationship between Central Asia and the US was developed under the 
shadow of US criticism on the promotion democracy until September 11. The events 
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of September 11 were the turning point in the US-Central Asian relations. After 
September 11, the US put aside its criticism of democratic deficiencies in order to 
preserve their access to strategically important fixed assets: military bases, 
hydrocarbon resources, and pipelines in the region.235 
After September 11, the US requested military cooperation from the Central 
Asian states for the Operation Enduring Freedom. Uzbekistan was the first to 
respond to US needs. On October 5, Uzbekistan and the US agreed upon the use of 
Khanabad Airport for cargo flights to Afghanistan. Then, Kyrgyzstan opened its 
Manas Airport to NATO’s use and lastly Kazakhstan consented to the use of three 
airports and over flight rights by the US and NATO forces. Turkmenistan gave 
permission for over flights and the transport of humanitarian cargo to Afghanistan.236  
After September 11, Uzbekistan became an indispensable ally for the US and 
whose cooperation was desperately needed for the war on terrorism in 
Afghanistan.237 Meanwhile Uzbekistan was trying to cut its dependence on Russia in 
security affairs, having withdrawn from the CST. Although it established close 
bilateral relations with Russia, it was trying to diversify its relations. Uzbekistan has 
ambitious aims for regional leadership. However, Russia has always tried to maintain 
the balance between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The war on terrorism was a chance 
for Uzbekistan to become a major regional ally of the US. US-Uzbekistan relations 
improved dramatically during this period. In March 2002, they signed “United 
States- Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 
Framework” in which the US was first to offer a security guarantee to a country in 
the former Soviet region.238  
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However, this close relationship fell apart after the US criticism on the 
Andijan events. The US was encouraged by the success of the Colored Revolutions 
in the former Soviet region and responded critically to the Uzbek government’s use 
of force during the uprisings. The US and the West demanded an independent 
international investigation but the Uzbek government rejected international 
involvement. Uzbekistan claimed that the force was the appropriate response against 
this terrorist uprising and the incident investigated by Uzbek authorities.239  
Uzbekistan responded to the US critics on Andijan harshly because 
Uzbekistan was suspicious about the US intention to promote democracy and 
revolutionary change in this area. For Uzbekistan, liberal ideas were the worst 
possible prescription for their regime and their country.240 In order to prevent the US 
from doing so, Uzbekistan immediately demanded the evacuation of the K2 air 
bases.  
The US evacuated its bases in Uzbekistan in 2005 following the Andijan 
events. However, Uzbekistan took a new step in early 2008 to allow US nationals to 
use its Termez airbase, which the Germans were also using. This approval covers 
individuals from the civil-advisory and administrative structure of the alliance, and 
grants access only on a “case-by-case” basis.241 Even this development represents 
considerable progress in Uzbek-US relations. This does not demonstrate a real 
tendency for repairing the relations that were damaged after the Andijan events.  
Real progress has been seen in relations between the NATO and 
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan put aside its strict neutrality policy with the new 
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government and the new President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov has allowed 
NATO the use of its installations for supporting missions in Afghanistan.242 
Uncertainties about the duration and scope of the US presence in Central Asia 
were a source of worry for Russia and China. They demanded a clear timetable for 
the withdrawal of the US forces from Central Asia. The Colored Revolutions of 
2003-2004 and the Andijan Uprisings of 2005 generated the conditions for 
Uzbekistan to demand from the US the evacuation of Karshi-Khanabad airbase. The 
backing of Russia and China was one of the most important determinants in 
Uzbekistan’s decision. Due to Russian and Chinese pressure and economic problems, 
Kyrgyzstan first demanded the increase in rents.243 Manas airbase is a major source 
of income for economically poor Kyrgyzstan. Lastly, in February 2009, after the 
promise of Russian economic support, Kyrgyzstan's parliament has approved a 
government order for the evacuation of the Manas Air Base.244   
It is important to note that in these developments, the backing of China and 
Russia play a crucial role but the US policies towards the region was another 
significant factor. The democratic statements of the US and its supportive role in 
Colored Revolutions alienated the autocratic leaders of Central Asia. Domestic and 
external factors have been two determinants that identify the US foreign policy 
towards Central Asia. In domestic factors, liberal values are the key element. In some 
cases, the even US put aside its demands on economic and politic reforms; its liberal 
approach is always a shadow over its relations with Central Asian states. 
 
                                                 
242 Cooley, p. 1180. 
243 Stephen Blank, ‘U.S. Interests in Central Asia and Their Challenges’, Demokratizatsiya, June 22, 
2007, p. 317. 
244"radio free europe radio liberty." Feb 19, 2009. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Approves_US_Air_Base_Closure_Threatening_Afghan_Su
pply_Chain_/1495890.html (accessed March 5, 2009).   
 91 
4.2.2 Energy Security and the US 
 
Energy security is another driving force that pushes the US to engage in 
Central Asian politics. The US excessively depends on the Middle East in the energy 
sector. Iran is one of the largest oil and gas producers but the US applied sanctions 
on Iran because of its regime established after the revolution in 1979. The US has 
criticized Iran for supporting terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and undermining the 
Middle East peace process. For this reason, the US cannot use Iranian energy 
resources. The US is over-dependent on a small number of producers in the unstable 
Middle East.245 Due to this Caspian energy resources have vital importance for the 
US and western counties in order to diversify their energy supply. 
Although, energy resources in Central Asia provoked international interest 
and a notion of a “second Middle East,” the reserve capacity of this area is not 
certain.246First explorations show that this area cannot challenge the capacity of 
Middle East. New investment and technical capacities will improve the supply. 
However, other than the supply problem, transportation is another difficulty in 
Central Asia, which is a landlocked area. Moreover, Russia has a monopoly for 
transferring Central Asian energy to outside world because of its formerly Soviet 
infrastructure. Iran is another alternative route that transports Central Asian energy. 
For the US foreign policy, to establish other routes for the transport of Central Asian 
energy is a matter of national interest.  
From the beginning, the US advocated that the transportation of the Caspian 
region energy resources to the world market is a matter of geopolitics and not 
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necessarily of economics and engineering.247 In this regard, , the US sponsored 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline for bypassing Russia and Iran in spite of 
Russian objections. The US has long urged Kazakhstan to construct a pipeline under 
the Caspian that would be connected to BTC. Another alternative route supported by 
the US is Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP), (or trans-Afghan natural gas 
pipeline) which could be extended to India. The aim of the US in the diversification 
of transit routes converge with Central Asian aims to break their dependence on 
Russia.248 However, even if US firms have been successful in maintaining access to 
Central Asian energy market, diversification of transit routes is still an unrealized 
goal, after the most recent last energy deals Central Asian states are now even more 
dependent on Russia. 
 
 
4.2.3 Iran, Radical Islam and the US 
 
One of the main goals of the US in Central Asia is to protect the region from 
the influence of Iran and to prevent Iran from having a regional role. The Iranian 
Islamic revolution created paranoia in US foreign policy. The US tries to persuade 
Central Asian states to avoid the Iranian model. For this reason, the US supports the 
Turkish model of secular government as an alternative to the Iranian model.249  
It is difficult to identify the US’s interest in Central Asia but it is even more 
difficult to determine its policy implications. Two main American interests in this 
region are the accessibility to energy resources and the prevention of terrorism. 
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However, many different determinants affect the policy options of the US in the 
region and the results of these policies can create unintended results.250 As in the case 
of Uzbekistan, the US did not want to alienate Uzbekistan but its liberal values 
created such a result nonetheless. This does not mean that the Andijan events are the 
end of the Uzbek-US relations. This demonstrates that the predicting the course of 
relations is not easy in this context.  
The presence of the US has deeply affected the region. The Afghan threat was 
a major security threat for the stability of the region. Russia and China were not 
willing to deal with Afghanistan. The US operations in the Afghanistan and NATO 
presence in this country increased stability in Central Asia. During these operations, 
terrorist groups operating in Central Asia, such as the IMU supported by Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban suffered losses and lost their power. The leader of IMU, Namangani 
was even killed during these operations. 
 Increased US and international interest in the Central Asian region increased 
assistance and international aid but they are still limited to solving regional social 
and economic problems.251 Terrorism and radical Islamism are the main security 
threats towards the regional and global powers. Social and economic problems of the 
region trigger these regional security threats. The situation in Afghanistan is vital for 
Central Asian governments. Terrorist groups in the region use drug trafficking as 
their source of income. Central Asia is the primary conduit of drug trafficking from 
Afghanistan to Europe.252 For this reason, the US operation to Afghanistan and 
reconstruction process is fundamental for Central Asian security.  
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The US role in Central Asian security is crucial but the US does not support a 
regional approach in the region. The NATO PfP program backed by the US in 
Central Asia is based on bilateral relations. The US is not a driving force for 
multilateral initiatives in Central Asia. Its Afghanistan operation is losing its 
influence on US foreign policy. This is affecting its relations with the Central Asian 
countries. However, Central Asia is also an important determinant in global power 
politics. Accordingly, the US will not want to abandon the region to Russia or China 
or other regional states. The US must develop a coherent foreign policy towards the 
region to provide necessary support for the stability in the region. 
 
 
4.3 China Role in Central Asian Security 
 
To analyze the Chinese security approach towards Central Asia, it is vital to 
understand the concept of comprehensive national strength. Chinese long-term 
strategy is based on a concept that foregrounds the vitality of the military, politics 
and economics in analyzing Chinese security.253 
According to this concept, four major factors became prominent in Chinese 
foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. China aims for stability around 
neighboring regions, the improvement of economic, technologic and military 
capacities while protecting its socio-politic structure and stability, the satisfaction of  
energy demands in order to sustain economic development and the improvement of 
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its status in post-Cold War world system.254 These four factors deeply influence 
Chinese-Central Asian relations. 
 To sustain its peaceful rise and domestic economic development, China 
requires internal and external stability. Accordingly, Central Asian states have an 
important place in Chinese foreign policy as a neighboring region. China wants to 
establish good relations with Central Asia. Moreover, China considers major powers 
in the world such as the US and Russia and their role in Central Asia. China tries not 
provoking major powers and to eliminate the notion of a “China threat”255, which 
appeared because of its immense economic growth and military might. China has 
good economic relations with the US and the Russia and it does not want to harm 
this relationship due to the competition in Central Asia. Major power relations have a 
priority over Central Asian states. 
 China established diplomatic relations with the five newly independent states 
of Central Asia immediately after the dissolution of Soviet Union. China shares a 
lengthy border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moreover, Eastern 
Turkistan is accepted as part of geographical and cultural Central Asia. Due to this 
geographical proximity, China is an important player in Central Asian security.  
 The first objectives of China towards the Central Asian region right after their 
independence were to achieve economic openness mostly in non-energy trade and 
cheap consumer goods and to sustain stability in East Turkistan region.256 Non- 
energy trade was a top priority for Chinese economic security because China was not 
a net oil importer until 1993. Energy security has influenced China’s relations with 
Central Asia since the end of 1990s. Trade was important for the sustainability of 
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Chinese economic growth and Central Asian market was newly opened to the world 
and was full of opportunity for China. However, economic bottlenecks in Central 
Asian countries limited the Chinese entrance to the Central Asian market. 
 
 
4.3.1 Eastern Turkestan and Chinese Security 
 
 In the first period of Chinese-Central Asian relations, Chinese concerns about 
Central Asia determined the progress of the relationship. The common ethnic and 
cultural structure of Eastern Turkistan and Central Asia led to growing anxiety for 
Chinese authorities after the independence of Central Asian states.  
Central Asian countries do not offer any conventional threats towards China 
but the demographic similarities were a potential threat towards Chinese internal 
stability. The end of USSR and the emergence of new independent states has been a 
promising example for the minorities in Eastern Turkistan.257 
China was afraid of the spread of the demand for independence and a 
resulting secessionist movement. Ethnic and religious movements started to 
influence the Eastern Turkistan region. In order to prevent the spread of these 
movements, China increased its border security and its relations with Central Asian 
states.258 
China, Russia, and the Central Asian states had unresolved border problems 
inherited from the Soviet era. These problems were resolved with the participation of 
five players in consecutive meetings that encourages mutual confidence. During 
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these meetings China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan termed 
themselves the Shanghai Five. The Shanghai Five became Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization with the membership of Uzbekistan in 2001. 
Apart from defining borders, China applied different policies in order to 
prevent secessionist movements. China applied political pressure to Eastern 
Turkistan. Meanwhile China planned projects for the economic reconstruction of the 
region in order to prevent the poverty that feeds secessionist movements. Other than 
these precautions, in order to change ethnic structure of Eastern Turkistan, China 
supported Han immigration to this province.259 However, these policies are a point 
for discussion outside the framework of this thesis. 
The ethnic minority in Eastern Turkistan, mainly Uighurs, escaped to Central 
Asia. The Uighur diaspora found a safe haven for their organization in Central Asia 
after independence especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, Central 
Asian leaders could not endanger their relations with China. China encouraged 
Central Asian states to prevent or cancel political events of the Uighur diaspora in 
their countries while pushing SCO to focus on Uighur separatist networks. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan declared their support and they 
acknowledged that national separation is a harmful destructive force.260 Moreover, 
these groups demonstrated tendencies towards radical Islamism. Islamic movements 
in Central Asia began to threaten the regimes’ security. For this reason, Central 
Asian leaders restricted the rights of Uighur émigrés and deported suspected Uighur 
separatists.261  
The main point is the role of Eastern Turkistan on China-Central Asia 
relations. The fear of the secession of Eastern Turkistan is the origin of the SCO. The 
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Shanghai sprit aims to prevent terrorism, separatism, and extremism. China chose the 
path of cooperation with Central Asia for solving its internal security problems. 
Therefore, China for the first time in its history participated to a military exercise 
outside its borders in the framework of SCO. An anti-terror exercise was first held in 
Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and then in Kazakhstan and China in 2003.262 
 
 
4.3.2 China and SCO in Central Asia 
 
The SCO resulted from a Chinese diplomatic initiative and this is the first 
organization in which China assumes a leading role.263 Russia has close multilateral 
and bilateral relations with Central Asia both in economic terms and in security 
affairs. However, China started to develop its relations with the region in mid-1990s. 
The region is crucial for the Chinese economy and security. Although Russia is less 
interested in improving economic cooperation in the framework of SCO, China 
directs the organization to develop its economic cooperation. China ‘s aims are to 
improve its trade with the region, to facilitate the supply of energy, to assist the 
development of the western part of the country and in part to help remove the low 
level of development in Central Asia that nourished extremism.264  
Chinese foreign policy towards Russia and the US affects its relations with 
Central Asian region. Sino-Soviet relations had begun to recover after the mid-1980s. 
However, Russian foreign policy towards the West and especially towards the US 
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affected its relations with China. Its pro-western altitude estranged China, which is 
anxious about the US containment policy regarding China. However, after 2004 the 
China-Russia rapprochement influenced Chinese relations with Central Asia 
particularly in the framework of SCO.265 China’s desire to improve its role in the 
international system and support of multilateralism accelerated its cooperation with 
Central Asian states.  
The close relationship with Central Asia will provide China with many 
opportunities. First, in this way China will break its containment by the US. Second, 
China has problems with Russia in the supply of energy resources. Pipeline projects 
materialize slowly and cannot satisfy the growing Chinese energy thirst. Indeed, the 
Chinese aim is to provide one-third of its oil imports from Central Asia and Russia, 
with twenty percent coming from Russia. However, China is anxious about 
dependence on Russia, and for this reason, it is developing its relations with 
Kazakhstan on energy issues.266 
Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asia also depends on American 
positions. The region increased its strategic importance after September 11. The US 
military settled in Afghanistan and the game in the region has complicated. 
Therefore, China developed a strategy that aims to ensure limiting any superpower’s 
impact on Central Asia.267 However, China avoids provoking superpowers because 
of its general strategy of a peaceful rise. China has very close economic relationship 
with the US. Although, the permanent American presence in Central Asia has 
disturbed China, China avoids criticizing the US openly. Meanwhile, the Russian 
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return to Central Asia increased Chinese concerns. China wants to balance Russia by 
increasing the institutionalization of the SCO. 
China has many different policy objectives in Central Asia other than to 
ensure stability in its western provinces. Regime security, the reduction of ethnic 
strife, territorial integrity, and even the economic development of the region is 
crucial for its strategy of internal and external stability.268 Accordingly, China is 
aware of the fact that Central Asian states cannot solve their problems alone. For this 
reason, China accelerated cooperation with these countries on a multilateral basis. 
 China as an economic giant under a communist rule is an example of 
successful authoritarian structure to Central Asian leaders. Moreover, China supports 
authoritarian regimes in Central Asia for the stability in the region. Russia also 
appears as the guarantor of regime security in Central Asia. Russia is a democratic 
country that still possesses a Soviet authoritarian legacy. China criticizes the role of 
foreign powers in fomenting internal dissent within the framework of the SCO. Non-
intervention in domestic politics is a crucial clause supported by both Russia and 
China.269 This makes the SCO a preferred option for cooperation among Central 
Asian leaders trying to protect their regimes against the criticism of the West and the 
US. Moreover, China is a reliable ally that supports their regime against external and 
internal threats.  
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4.3.3 Energy Security, China and Central Asia 
 
Chinese economic security is a vital part of consolidating its international 
status as a major power in economics, politics, and security areas. Chinese strengths 
depend mostly on its economic growth and its internal stability. Economic security is 
closely related to its capability of securing access to raw materials and global 
markets.270 
 Recently China has surpassed Japan and became the second higher consumer 
in the world. China mostly relies on the Middle East for oil imports.271 However, the 
diversification of suppliers is the main goal of China for their energy security and for 
its continued economic growth. The geographic proximity of Central Asia and its 
rich resources make this region a good opportunity for China. As a neighbor, Russia 
has this capacity as well and China has increased its energy relations with Russia. 
However, historical problems and the unstable flow and highly competitive nature of 
Russian oil exports to Northeast Asia encouraged China to look for secondary 
sources of foreign energy beyond the Middle East.272 
 In energy relations with Central Asia, other than gas and oil, China looks for 
electricity for its Northwest regions. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess hydroelectric 
power for electricity production, which is their only natural resource. While 
Kyrgyzstan is exporting its electricity to China, Tajikistan could not because of 
technological and economic problems.273 
 Lastly, the Central Asian region does not have an important role in today’s 
Chinese energy import but the excessive investment in Central Asian energy sector, 
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in pipeline construction, and in improvement of road and rail transportation 
demonstrate the long-term Chinese strategy towards the region.274  
The Chinese model of economic modernization impresses Central Asian 
leaders because this shows them the way of pursuing market reforms without 
relinquishing state control.275 Close political systems increase the chance of 
cooperation between Central Asia and China in the current circumstances. China 
supports regime security in Central Asia. Moreover, China provides a suitable 
opportunity for Central Asian security regionalism by supporting SCO. The Chinese 
pragmatic approach to sustain stability around its borders has helped solve Central 
Asian regional problems. To cooperate with China increases Central Asian security 
while diminishing the Central Asian fear of the “Chinese threat.” China is a 
balancing power in the region against the excessive influence of other major powers, 
the US and Russia.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION: MERGING THEORY WITH HISTORY 
 
 
This thesis accepts Central Asia as a regional security complex. Barry 
Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory defines RSC as “a set of units whose 
major processes of securitization and desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that 
their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one 
another”.276 Mutual security threats connect Central Asian states to each other. 
Central Asian states geographically land locked in Asia try to cope with various 
kinds of security problems such as terrorism, radical Islamism, ethnic conflict in 
Ferghana valley, illegal migration, drug trafficking, environmental problems son on. 
Central Asia was seen as a remote region from major powers competition right after 
their independence. However, international developments increased its importance in 
global security. Especially, after September 11 attacks, world attention turned to this 
region.  
These developments increased the security regionalism. In this thesis, 
development of security regionalism in this regional security complex was examined 
in accordance with the major power politics and security regional cooperation 
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organizations. Different from many studies, this work emphasized also to the 
September 11 attacks and its impact on the Central Asian security regionalism.  
The effect of the September 11 attacks on the development of the security 
regionalism is crucial.  New Regionalism theory based its assumption mainly on the 
post-Cold War international system settings. However, September 11 attacks, the US 
operations on Afghanistan and Iraq have tremendous impacts on the security 
understanding in international relations. In chapter III, this thesis evaluated the effect 
of these changes in international system to the regional organizations in Central Asia. 
These changes accelerated institutionalization and organizational structure of CST 
and Shanghai Five. In chapter IV that studied major powers’ politics towards Central 
Asia, demonstrated the changing foreign policies of major powers according to the 
changes in international politics and balance of power. 
 The second chapter assessed historical and theoretical background of 
regionalism and security. In this part, it is important to understand new regionalism 
theory that based its assumption on the new security threats emerged after the Cold 
War. These security threats are very crucial for Central Asia, these newly emerged 
security challenges became clear, and their importance increased for major powers 
after the September 11 attacks. Terrorism became the most important security threats 
and shaped the international agenda. Major Powers started to take measures for 
preventing security threats that nourish terrorism such as drug trafficking that 
provides the necessary economic power to the terrorist groups. Major Powers had 
taken many different types of steps in the name of preventing terrorism. New 
regionalism theory does not pay sufficient attention to September 11 attacks. 
Especially, September 11 attacks influenced deeply the security agenda in 
Central Asia. The US operation on Afghanistan increased the role of Central Asian 
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states in international politics. Historical role of Russia in its traditional sphere of 
influence started to be challenged by the US. In response to the US’s entrance to the 
region, China and Russia started to use regional organizations in order to increase 
their engagement in the region. Mainstream literature on Central Asian politics 
claims that major powers interest to Central Asia will cause competition and conflict 
in the region. Major Powers, the US, Russia and China try to increase their role in 
Central Asia. However, fragile structure of the regional security reveals clearly that 
any conflict in the region will threaten global stability and peace. 
In this Regional Security Complex, five Central Asian states struggle with 
various security threats. Their perceptions understanding of security and policies 
differ. However, their security and stability is interconnected. Although, 
Turkmenistan continues to have a neutrality policy towards regional cooperation, it 
also shares the same concerns with the other Central Asian states. Current political 
regime in Turkmenistan stays away from any regional groupings but this does not 
demonstrate that Turkmenistan will always continue to apply this policy. 
Central Asian regional security problems necessitate regional measures and 
responses. However, Central Asian states have economic and political problems that 
made unrealistic to think a regional cooperation without a major power can establish 
an essential security policy that can solve these problems. Firstly, economic 
cooperation is necessary in order to increase economic level of Central Asian states. 
Economically powerful region can create the necessary situation for establishing a 
security regional cooperation.  
In this point, Central Asian states call for external powers for assistance. Vise 
versa, external powers want to engage in regional politics because of various national 
interests mentioned before. However, Central Asian states took lessons from their 
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history. Although, Central Asian states are dependent on Russia because of historical 
ties, they always fear from the return of Russian imperialism. For this reason, they 
try to balance Russian role in Central Asia with other external powers. In this point, 
the role of China and the US come into prominence.  
Increasing security threats in the region, growing major powers’ interest 
coincide with the “second wave” of regionalism. This increases the role of 
multilateral initiatives rather than bilateral, one for providing security and stability in 
Central Asia.  Due to that, SCO and CSTO increased their role in the regional 
security. However, it is too early to claim that the members of these organizations are 
secure but the agenda settings and institutionalization of these organizations 
demonstrate that they try to increase stability and security. Indeed, bilateral relations 
of regional states with major powers increase tension in the region. The US, Russia 
and PRC cannot afford to provide security guaranties to every states in Central Asia. 
When bilateral relations analyzed, it is obvious that major powers favor some 
countries in the region. As a result, the actions of major powers complicate regional 
balance. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan is powerful in terms of demography, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have energy resources, which increase their economic 
situation but Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are small and poor in terms of economic 
capacity. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are competing for the regional leadership role. 
Bilateral assistance of major powers can augment this competition and this 
competition will threaten regional security and stability.  
Many different external and internal dynamics affect the security regionalism 
in Central Asia. It is important to underline that current capacities of Central Asian 
states are not enough to provide security and stability in the region. Regional 
multilateral security initiatives increase mutual confidence but Central Asia has 
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greater security problems that needs technical, military and personnel assistance. For 
this reason, Central Asian states have to focus their energy to improve multilateral 
cooperation that covers major powers. Meanwhile they have to balance the presence 
of external powers in the region. 
The pragmatic concerns of Central Asian states and major powers; The US, 
Russia and PRC lead them to increase cooperation on security in the region. 
Accordingly, the label of New Great Game in terms of security is not appropriate for 
the situation in Central Asia because competition will damage pragmatic concerns of 
external and internal powers. 
Russia and China have more room for maneuver in security affairs than the 
US in Central Asia because of their geographic proximity. Even the US presence in 
Afghanistan did not change this reality. For this reason, future prospects gave more 
chance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SCO is preferential for Central 
Asian partners because two neighboring major powers China and Russia balance 
each other. Member states of SCO do not intervene to the internal affairs of other 
member states. Close political systems of member states provide regime security to 
Central Asian autocratic leaders. Furthermore, SCO reject unipolar world system and 
support multipolarity. The success of SCO in establishing security in an 
institutionalized manner will challenge unipolar world system that the US 
encourages. Multipolarity will increase world stability and security.  
In conclusion, this thesis argues that Central Asia is a Regional Security 
Complex that security threats in the region cause dependency between the members 
of this complex. Moreover, regional security threats cannot be resolved by individual 
states, cooperation is urgently required. Regional states without major powers cannot 
create the necessary organization because of its internal deficiencies and the 
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complexity of security problems in the region. The pragmatic interests of major 
powers lead them to share the burden of Central Asian security problems. Due to this 
regional settings, this thesis claim that security regionalism will increase in Central 
Asia. Especially, SCO will increase its role in the region in security affairs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
"CICA". 2008. http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1 (accessed       
November 20, 2008). 
 
"Global Security org.". April 25, 2005. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/centrasbat.htm (accessed November 
16, 2008). 
 
"James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies." 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060905_canwfz.pdf (accessed 
November 23, 2008). 
 
"North Atlantic Treaty Organization." October 1, 2008. 
http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html (accessed November 14, 2008). 
  
"Kyrgyzstan Approves US Airbase Closure.” Feb 19, 2009. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Approves_US_Air_Base_Closure_Th
reatening_Afghan_Supply_Chain_/1495890.html (accessed March 5, 2009).  
  
Ahrari, Ehsan. 2003. “The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A view from 
Washington”, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no.2, pp. 157-166. 
 
Akbarzadeh Shahram. 2004. “Keeping Central Asia stable”, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol.25, No.4, pp. 689-705. 
 
Allison, Roy and Christoph Bluth. 1998. Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, 
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Allison, Roy and Lena Jonson. 2001. Central Asian Security: The New International 
Context, Washington: Brooking Institution Press. 
 
Allison, Roy. 2004. “Regionalism, Regional Structure and Security Management in 
Central Asia”, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, pp. 463-483 
 
Allison, Roy. 2008. “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security 
in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 185-202. 
 
Amanov Şatlık. 2007. ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikaları, İstanbul: Gökkube. 
 110 
 
Aydın, Mustafa. 2005 Küresel Politikada Orta Asya, Ankara: Nobel Yayın. 
 
Baev, Pavel K. 2004. “Assessing Russia’s card: three petty games in Central Asia”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17:2, pp. 269-283. 
 
Bhatty R. and R. Bronson. 2000. “NATO’s Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia”, Survival, Vol.42, No.3, pp. 129-145. 
 
Bilgin, Pınar. 2005. Regional Security in the Middle East, London: Routledge 
Curzon. 
 
Blank, Stephen. 2007. “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and Their Challenges”, 
Demokratizatsiya, June 22, p. 317. 
 
Bohr, Annette. 2003. ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission impossible?’, 
Helsinki Monitor, no: 3, pp. 254-268. 
 
Bordyuzha, N. 2007. “CSTO: Counteraction Tool against New Threats”, 
International Affairs, No. 002, Vol. 53, pp. 54-58. 
 
Buszynski, Leszek. 2005. “Russia’s New Role in Central Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 
45, No. 4, pp. 546-565. 
 
Buzan, Barry and Waever, Ole. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Cafersoy, Nazım. 2001. “Güvenlik ve Bağımsızlığın Gölgesinde Rusya-Özbekistan 
İlişkiler” (1991-2001), Avrasya Dosyası Özbekistan Özel, cilt 7, sayı 3, pp.152-
187. 
 
Chufrin, Gennadii. 2007. “The SCO: Changing Priorities”, International Affairs, Vol. 
53, No.1, pp. 57-61. 
 
Chung, Chien-peng. 2004. “The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China’s 
Changing Influence in Central Asia”, The China Quarterly, No: 180, pp. 990-
1009 
 
Cooley, Alexander. 2008. “Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values 
and interests in Central Asia”, International Affairs, 84: 6, pp. 1173-1188. 
 
Cornell, Svante E. 2008. “War in Georgia, Jitters All Around”, Current History, pp. 
307-314. 
 
Croissant, Michael P. 1997. ‘U.S. Interests in the Caspian Sea Basin’, Comparative 
Strategy, 16:4, pp. 353-367. 
 
 111 
Dedeoğlu, Beril. 2008. Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji, İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl 
Yayınları. 
 
Demirtepe, M. Turgut. 2008 Orta Asya & Kafkasya Güç Politikası, Ankara: USAK. 
 
Erdoğdu, Hikmet. 2004. Avrupa’nın geleceğinde Türkiye’nin Önemi ve NATO 
İttifakı, İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıcılık. 
 
Erol, M.S. and Ç. Tunç. 2003.“11 Eylül Sonrası ABD’nin Küresel Güç 
Mücadelesinde Orta Asya”, Avrasya Dosyası, Küresel Değerlendirme 
Özel,Vol.9, No. 3, pp. 5-28. 
 
Farrell, Mary, Hettne, Björn, and Langenhove, Luk Van (eds) 2005. Global Politics 
of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, London: Pluto Press. 
 
Fawcett, Louise and Hurell, Andrew. 1995. Regionalism in World Politics, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fawcett, Louise. 2004. “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of 
regionalism”, International Affairs, 80, 3, pp. 429-446. 
 
Ferdinand, Peter. 2007 ‘Sunset, sunrise: China and Russia construct a new 
relationship’, International Affairs, 83:5, pp. 841-867. 
 
Flemming, S. Hansen. 2008 “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Asian 
Affairs, Vol. 39, no.2, pp. 217-232. 
 
Gleason, Gregory. 1997. The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
 
Gleason, Gregory. 2001.”Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the 
Shanghai Forum”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.53, No.7, pp. 1077-1095. 
 
Haas, Marcel de. 2007. “The Shanghai Cooperation and the OSCE: Two of a kind?” 
Helsinki Monitor: Security and Human Rights, no: 3, pp. 246-259. 
 
Hansen, Birthe, and Heurlin, Bertel. 2000. The New World Order: Contrasting 
Theories, London: Macmillan Press. 
 
Hettne, Björn, and Söderbaum Fredrik. 2000 ‘Theorizing the Rise of Regionness’, 
New Political Economy, Vol.5, No: 3, p. 457-474. 
 
Hettne, Björn. 2005. “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, New Political Economy, 
Vol.1, No: 4, pp. 543-571. 
 
Hill, Fiona. 2002. ‘The United States and Russia in Central Asia: Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran’, Speech Given at Aspen Institute 
Congressional Program. 
 
 112 
Hocking, Brian and Smith, Micheal. 1995. World Politics: An introduction to 
International Relations, London: Prentice Hall. 
 
Hurell, Andrew. 2007. “One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study 
of international society”, International Affairs, 83:1, pp. 127-146. 
 
Ifantis, Kostas. 2006. ‘International Security: A Paradigm Shift?’, SAM Paper, No.1. 
 
Joint Statement of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan on the 
Almaty Meeting, July 3, 1998, http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/joint-
statement980703.html (accessed November 14, 2008) 
 
Jonson, Lena. 2004 Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian 
Foreign Policy, London: I.B. Tauris.  
 
Karaca, R. Kutay. 2003. Dünyadaki Yeni Güç Çin: Tek Kutuptan, Çift Kutuba,  
İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık. 
 
Karagiannis, Emmanuel. 2003. ‘The US-Iranian Relationship after 11 September 
2001 and the transportation of Caspian Energy’, Central Asian Survey, 22 (2/3), 
pp.151-162. 
 
Karasar, Hasan Ali. 2001. “Bağımsızlık Sonrası Türkistan’da Rus Siyaset”, Avrasya 
Dosyası, Rusya Özel, Cilt: 6, sayı: 4, pp. 220-271. 
 
Karasar, Hasan Ali and Sanat K. Kuşkumbayev. 2009. Türkistan Bütünleşmesi: 
Merkezi Asya’da Birlik Arayışları 1991-2001, Ankara: Ötüken. 
 
Khamraev, Farkhod. 2002. “Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia: prospects and potential”, Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Analyst, 17: 5, pp. 54-58 
 
Kimura, Hiroshi. 2005. “Russia and the CIS in 2004: Putin’s Offensive and 
Defensive Actions”, Asian Survey, Vol.45, No: 1, pp. 59-66. 
 
Kleveman, Lutz. 2003. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, New 
York: Grove Press. 
 
Kirshner, Jonathan. 2006. Globalization and National Security, New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Kurtov, Azhdar. 2008. “The CSTO, Guam: Transformation of the Post-Soviet Area” 
Central Asia and the Caucasus 51-52. 3-4, http://www.ca-
c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-03-04/25.shtml. (accessed October 9, 2008). 
 
Lake, David A. and Morgan, Patrick M. 1997. Regional Orders: Building Security in 
a New World, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
 113 
Lanteign, Marc. 2006. “In Medias Res: The Development of the Shanghai Co-
operation Organization as a Security Community”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, 
No.4, pp. 605-622. 
 
Laumulin, Murat. 2006. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as Geopolitical 
Bluff? A view from Astana, Russie. Nei Visions no:12. 
 
Luong, Pauline J. and Weinthal, Erika. 2002 ‘New Friends, New Fears in Central 
Asia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, pp. 61-70. 
 
Macfarlane, Neil S. 2004. “The United States and regionalism in Central Asia”, 
International Affairs, 80, 3, pp. 447-461. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Milner, Helen V. 1999. “The New Wave of 
Regionalism”, International Organization 53, 3, pp. 589-627. 
 
Matveeva, Anna. 2007. “Return to Heartland: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia”, The 
International Spectator, 42:1, pp. 43-62. 
 
Meshabi, Mohiaddin. 1993. “Russian foreign policy and security in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus”, Central Asian Survey, 12:2, pp. 181-215. 
 
Mite, Valentinas. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. August 29, 
2005.http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/26DAB4C9-5BA1-4193-
86E7-62FC991F8A6C.html (accessed April 7, 2008). 
 
Mittelman, James H. 1996. ‘Rethinking the “New Regionalism” in the Context of 
Globalization’, Global Governance, 2, pp. 189-213. 
 
Olcott, M. B., A. Aslund, and S. W. Garnett. 1999Getting it Wrong: Regional 
Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Washington: The 
Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Ong, Russell. 2005. “China’s Security Interest in Central Asia”, Central Asian 
Survey, 24 (4), pp. 425-437. 
 
Oresman, Matthew. 2004. “Catching the Shanghai Spirit,” Foreign Policy, No.142, 
pp. 78-80. 
 
Partnership for Peace, 2001. NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of 
Information and Press. 
 
Raşid, Ahmed. 2007. Taliban: Islamiyet, Petrol ve Orta Asya’da yeni Büyük Oyun, 
İstanbul: Agora kitaplığı. 
 
Purtaş, Fırat. 2005. Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu, Ankara: Platin Yayınları. 
 
Rekuta, A. L. 2006 “The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Averting Security 
Threats in Central Asia”, Military Thought, October 1.  
 
 114 
Roger McDermott, "The Jamestown Foundation." March 10, 2008. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3
3446 (accessed February 10, 2009). 
 
Rosecrance, Richard. 1991. “Regionalism and the post-Cold War era”, International 
Journal, pp. 373-393. 
 
Rumer, Boris. 2005. Central Asia at the End of the Transition, New York: M. E 
Sharpe. 
 
Rumer, Eugene. 2006. “The US Interests and Role in Central Asia after K2”, The 
Washington Quarterly, 29:3, pp. 141-154. 
 
Saat J. H. 2005. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, UK: Conflict Studies 
Research Center. 
 
Sakwa, Richard and Mark Webber. 1999. “The Commonwealth of Independent 
States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 
3. pp. 379-415. 
 
SCO website.  2004-2005. http://www.sectsco.org/html/00030.html (accessed 
November 14, 2008). 
 
Sheives, Kevin.2006 “China turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards 
Central Asia”, Pacific Affairs, Vol: 79, No. 2, pp. 205-224. 
 
Simon, Jeffrey. 2004. “Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era”, US 
Foreign Policy Agenda, Vol. 9, No. 2. 
 
Söderbaum Fredrik, and Shaw Timothy M. 2003. Theories of New Regionalism, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Stares, Paul B. 1998. The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, Tokyo: Japan 
Center for International Exchange. 
 
Trenin, Dimitri. 2003. ‘Southern Watch: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia’, Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 56, no.2, pp. 119-132. 
 
Valasek, Tomas. 2003. “US Policy toward the Caspian and Black Sea Region”, The 
Quarterly Journal, No. 1, pp. 15-22. 
 
Vayrynen, Raimo. 2003. “Regionalism: Old and New”, International Studies Review, 
5, pp. 25-52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION CHARTER277 
 
 
 
The People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
being the founding states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter 
SCO or the Organization),  
Based on historically established ties between their peoples;  
Striving for further enhancement of comprehensive cooperation;  
Desiring to jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and ensuring of security 
and stability in the region in the environment of developing political multi-polarity 
and economic and information globalization;  
Being convinced that the establishment of SCO will facilitate more efficient common 
use of opening possibilities and counteracting new challenges and threats;  
Considering that interaction within SCO will promote the realization of a huge 
potential of good neighborliness, unity and cooperation between States and their 
peoples;  
Proceeding from the spirit of mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual 
consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration to joint development that 
was clearly established at the meeting of heads of six States in 2001 in Shanghai;  
Noting that the compliance with the principles set out in the Agreement between the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Strengthening Confidence in 
the Military Field in the Border Area of 26 April, 1996, and in the Agreement 
                                                 
277 China Daily Website, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_614628.htm 
(accessed April 4, 2009) 
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between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan on Mutual 
Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area of 24 April, 1997, as well as in the 
documents signed at summits of heads of the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic 
of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in the period from 1998 to 2001, has 
made an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in 
the region and in the world;  
Reaffirming our adherence to the goals and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, other commonly acknowledged principles and rules of international law 
related to the maintenance of international peace, security and the development of 
good neighborly and friendly relations, as well as the cooperation between States;  
Guided by the provisions of the Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization of 15 June, 2001,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article 1 
Goals and Tasks  
The main goals and tasks of SCO are:  
to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member 
States;  
to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of 
peace, security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair 
and rational political and economic international order;  
to jointly counteract terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations, 
to fight against illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other types of criminal 
activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;  
to encourage the efficient regional cooperation in such spheres as politics, trade and 
economy, defense, law enforcement, environment protection, culture, science and 
technology, education, energy, transport, credit and finance, and also other spheres of 
common interest;  
to facilitate comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural 
development in the region through joint action on the basis of equal partnership for 
the purpose of a steady increase of living standards and improvement of living 
conditions of the peoples of the member States;  
to coordinate approaches to integration into the global economy;  
to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the 
international obligations of the member States and their national legislation;  
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to maintain and develop relations with other States and international organizations;  
to cooperate in the prevention of international conflicts and in their peaceful 
settlement;  
to jointly search for solutions to the problems that would arise in the 21st century.  
Article 2 
Principles  
The member States of SCO shall adhere to the following principles:  
mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and 
inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, 
non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral 
military superiority in adjacent areas;  
equality of all member States, search of common positions on the basis of mutual 
understanding and respect for opinions of each of them;  
gradual implementation of joint activities in the spheres of mutual interest;  
peaceful settlement of disputes between the member States;  
SCO being not directed against other States and international organizations;  
prevention of any illegitimate acts directed against the SCO interests;  
implementation of obligations arising out of the present Charter and other documents 
adopted within the framework of SCO, in good faith.  
Article 3 
Areas of Cooperation  
The main areas of cooperation within SCO shall be the following:  
maintenance of peace and enhancing security and confidence in the region;  
search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including 
issues arising within international organizations and international for;  
development and implementation of measures aimed at jointly counteracting 
terrorism, separatism and extremism, illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and other 
types of criminal activity of a transnational character, and also illegal migration;  
coordination of efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control;  
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support for, and promotion of regional economic cooperation in various forms, 
fostering favorable environment for trade and investments with a view to gradually 
achieving free flow of goods, capitals, services and technologies;  
effective use of available transportation and communication infrastructure, 
improvement of transit capabilities of member States and development of energy 
systems;  
sound environmental management, including water resources management in the 
region, and implementation of particular joint environmental programs and projects;  
mutual assistance in preventing natural and man-made disasters and elimination of 
their implications;  
exchange of legal information in the interests of development of cooperation within 
SCO;  
development of interaction in such spheres as science and technology, education, 
health care, culture, sports and tourism.  
The SCO member States may expand the spheres of cooperation by mutual 
agreement.  
Article 4 
Bodies  
1. For the implementation of goals and objectives of the present Charter the 
following bodies shall operate within the Organization:  
The Council of Heads of State;  
The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers);  
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs;  
Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies;  
The Council of National Coordinators;  
The Regional Antiterrorist Structure;  
Secretariat.  
2. The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the Regional 
Antiterrorist Structure, shall be governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the 
Council of Heads of State.  
3. The Council of Heads of State may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New 
bodies shall be established by the adoption of additional protocols to the present 
Charter which enter into force in the procedure, set forth in Article 21 of this Charter.  
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Article 5 
The Council of Heads of State  
The Council of Heads of State shall be the supreme SCO body. It shall determine 
priorities and define major areas of activities of the Organization, decide upon the 
fundamental issues of its internal arrangement and functioning and its interaction 
with other States and international organizations, as well as consider the most topical 
international issues.  
The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council of 
Heads of State shall be chaired by the head of State organizing this regular meeting. 
The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall generally be determined in the 
Russian alphabetic order of names of the SCO member States.  
Article 6 
The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers)  
The Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) shall approve the budget of 
the Organization, consider and decide upon major issues related to particular, 
especially economic, spheres of interaction within the Organization.  
The Council shall hold its regular meetings once a year. A meeting of the Council 
shall be chaired by the head of Government (Prime Minister) of the State on whose 
territory the meeting takes place.  
The venue of a regular meeting of the Council shall be determined by prior 
agreement among heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member States.  
Article 7 
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs  
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall consider issues related to day-to-
day activities of the Organization, preparation of meetings of the Council of Heads of 
State and holding of consultations on international problems within the Organization. 
The Council may, as appropriate, make statements on behalf of SCO.  
The Council shall generally meet one month prior to a meeting of the Council of 
Heads of State. Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs shall be convened on the initiative of at least two member States and upon 
consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member States. The venue of a 
regular or extraordinary meeting of the Council shall be determined by mutual 
agreement.  
The Council shall be chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member State 
on whose territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, 
during the period starting from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of 
Heads of State to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of 
State.  
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The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall represent the 
Organization in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Council.  
Article 8 
Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies  
According to decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of 
Government (Prime Ministers) heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the 
member States shall hold, on a regular basis, meetings for consideration of particular 
issues of interaction in respective fields within SCO.  
A meeting shall be chaired by the head of a respective ministry and/or agency of the 
State organizing the meeting. The venue and date of a meeting shall be agreed upon 
in advance.  
For the preparation and holding meetings the member States may, upon prior 
agreement, establish permanent or ad hoc working groups of experts which carry out 
their activities in accordance with the regulations adopted by the meetings of heads 
of ministries and/or agencies. These groups shall consist of representatives of 
ministries and/or agencies of the member States.  
Article 9 
The Council of National Coordinators  
The Council of National Coordinators shall be a SCO body that coordinates and 
directs day-to-day activities of the Organization. It shall make the necessary 
preparation for the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads 
of Government (Prime Ministers) and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
National coordinators shall be appointed by each member State in accordance with 
its internal rules and procedures.  
The Council shall hold its meetings at least three times a year. A meeting of the 
Council shall be chaired by the national coordinator of the member State on whose 
territory the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State takes place, from the 
date of the last ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State to the date of the 
next ordinary meeting of the Council of Heads of State.  
The Chairman of the Council of National Coordinators may on the instruction of the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs represent the Organization 
in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of 
National Coordinators.  
Article 10 
Regional Antiterrorist Structure  
The Regional Antiterrorist Structure established by the member States of the 
Shanghai Convention to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism of 15 June, 
2001, located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic, shall be a standing SCO body.  
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Its main objectives and functions, principles of its constitution and financing, as well 
as its rules of procedure shall be governed by a separate international treaty 
concluded by the member States, and other necessary instruments adopted by them.  
Article 11 
Secretariat  
Secretariat shall be a standing SCO administrative body. It shall provide 
organizational and technical support to the activities carried out in the framework of 
SCO and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organization.  
The Secretariat shall be headed by the Secretary-General to be appointed by the 
Council of Heads of State on nomination by the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs.  
The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the nationals of member 
States on a rotational basis in the Russian alphabetic order of the member States` 
names for a period of three years without a right to be reappointed for another period.  
The Secretary-General deputies shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs on nomination by the Council of National Coordinators. They cannot 
be representatives of the State from which the Executive Secretary has been 
appointed.  
The Secretariat officials shall be recruited from among nationals of the member 
States on a quota basis.  
The Secretary-General, his deputies and other Secretariat officials in fulfilling their 
official duties should not request or receive instructions from any member State 
and/or government, organization or physical persons. They should refrain from any 
actions that might affect their status as international officials reporting to SCO only.  
The member States shall undertake to respect the international character of the duties 
of the Secretary-General, his deputies and Secretariat staff and not to exert any 
influence upon them as they perform their official functions.  
The SCO Secretariat shall be located at Beijing (the People's Republic of China).  
Article 12 
Financing  
SCO shall have its own budget drawn up and executed in accordance with a special 
agreement between member States. This agreement shall also determine the amount 
of contributions paid annually by member States to the budget of the Organization on 
the basis of a cost-sharing principle.  
Budgetary resources shall be used to finance standing SCO bodies in accordance 
with the above agreement. The member States shall cover themselves the expenses 
related to the participation of their representatives and experts in the activities of the 
Organization.  
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Article 13 
Membership  
The SCO membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to 
respect the objectives and principles of this Charter and to comply with the 
provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in the framework of 
SCO.  
The admission of new members to SCO shall be decided upon by the Council of 
Heads of State on the basis of a representation made by the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in response to an official request from the State concerned addressed 
to the acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  
SCO membership of a member State violating the provisions of this Charter and/or 
systematically failing to meet its obligations under international treaties and 
instruments, concluded in the framework of SCO, may be suspended by a decision of 
the Council of Heads of State adopted on the basis of a representation made by the 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. If this State goes on violating its obligations, 
the Council of Heads of State may take a decision to expel it from SCO as of the date 
fixed by the Council itself.  
Any member State shall be entitled to withdraw from SCO by transmitting to the 
Depositary an official notification of its withdrawal from this Charter no later than 
twelve months before the date of withdrawal. The obligations arising from 
participation in this Charter and other instruments adopted within the framework of 
SCO shall be binding for the corresponding States until they are completely fulfilled.  
Article 14 
Relationship with Other States and International Organizations  
SCO may interact and maintain dialogue, in particular in certain areas of 
cooperation, with other States and international organizations.  
SCO may grant to the State or international organization concerned the status of a 
dialogue partner or observer. The rules and procedures for granting such a status 
shall be established by a special agreement of member States.  
This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the member States under 
other international treaties in which they participate.  
Article 15 
Legal Capacity  
As a subject of international law, SCO shall have international legal capacity. It shall 
have such a legal capacity in the territory of each member State, which is required to 
achieve its goals and objectives.  
SCO shall enjoy the rights of a legal person and may in particular:  
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- conclude treaties;  
- acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it;  
- appear in court as litigant;  
- open accounts and have monetary transactions made.  
Article 16 
Decisions-Taking Procedure  
The SCO bodies shall take decisions by agreement without vote and their decisions 
shall be considered adopted if no Member State has raised objections during the vote 
(consensus), except for the decisions on suspension of membership or expulsion 
from the Organization that shall be taken by "consensus minus one vote of the 
Member State concerned".  
Any member State may expose its opinion on particular aspects and/or concrete 
issues of the decisions taken which shall not be an obstacle to taking the decision as a 
whole. This opinion shall be placed on record.  
Should one or several member States be not interested in implementing particular 
cooperation projects of interest to other member States, non-participation of the 
above said member States in these projects shall not prevent the implementation of 
such cooperation projects by the member States concerned and, at the same time, 
shall not prevent the said member States from joining such projects at a later stage.  
Article 17 
Implementation of Decisions  
The decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member States 
in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation.  
Control of the compliance with obligations of the member States to implement this 
Charter, other agreements and decisions adopted within SCO shall be exercised by 
the SCO bodies within their competence.  
Article 18 
Permanent Representatives  
In accordance with their domestic rules and procedures, the member States shall 
appoint their permanent representatives to the SCO Secretariat, which will be 
members of the diplomatic staff of the embassies of the member States in Beijing.  
Article 19 
Privileges and Immunities  
SCO and its officials shall enjoy in the territories of all member States the privileges 
and immunities, which are necessary for fulfilling functions and achieving goals of 
the Organization.  
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The volume of privileges and immunities of SCO and its officials shall be 
determined by a separate international treaty.  
Article 20 
Languages  
The official and working languages of SCO shall be Russian and Chinese.  
Article 21 
Duration and Entry into Force  
This Charter shall be of indefinite duration.  
This Charter shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and shall enter into 
force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the fourth instrument of 
ratification.  
For a State, which signed this Charter and ratified it thereafter it shall enter into force 
on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary.  
Upon its entering into force this Charter shall be open for accession by any State.  
For each acceding State, this Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day 
following the date of receiving by the Depositary of appropriate instruments of 
accession.  
Article 22 
Settlement of Disputes  
In case of disputes or controversies, arising out of interpretation or application of this 
Charter member States shall settle them through consultations and negotiations.  
Article 23 
Amendments and Additions  
By mutual agreement of member States this Charter can be amended and 
supplemented. Decisions by the Council of Heads of State concerning amendments 
and additions shall be formalised by separate protocols which shall be its integral 
part and enter into force in accordance with the procedure provided for by Article 21 
of this Charter.  
Article 24 
Reservations  
No reservations can be made to this Charter which contradict the principles, goals 
and objectives of the Organisation and could prevent any SCO body from performing 
its functions. If at least two thirds of member States have objections the reservations 
must be considered as contradicting the principles, goals and objectives of the 
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Organisation or preventing any body from performing its functions and being null 
and void.  
Article 25 
Depositary  
The People's Republic of China shall be the Depositary of this Charter.  
Article 26 
Registration  
Pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Charter is subject to 
registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations.  
Done at Saint-Petersburg the seventh day of June 2002 in a single original in the 
Chinese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authoritative.  
The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with the Depositary who will 
circulate its certified copies to all signatory States.  
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APPENDIX II. 
 
 
CHARTER OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY 
ORGANIZATION278 
 
 
 
The State-Parties of the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992 (henceforth 
referred to as Treaty),  
acting in strict accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN) and the decisions of the Security Council of the UN, and based upon 
the universally acknowledged principles of international law;  
striving to create favourable and stable conditions for the overall development of the 
Treaty State-Parties and guaranteeing their security, sovereignty as was as territorial 
integrity; confirming their adherence to the goals and principles of the Treaty and to 
international agreements and decisions that are taken in its framework;  
determined to develop and deepen military-political cooperation in the interests of 
guaranteeing and strengthening national, regional and international security;  
put before themselves to goal to continue and enhance tight and broad friendly 
relations in the fields of foreign policy, the military and military-technological issues, 
and also in the sphere of opposing trans-national challenges and threats to the 
security of nations and people;  
acting upon the intent to increase the effectiveness of the activities in the framework 
of the Treaty  
have agreed on the following:  
Chapter I  
Establishment Of The Collective Security Treaty Organization  
Article 1  
The State-Parties of the Treaty establish the international regional Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (henceforth referred to as Organization).  
Article 2  
The provisions of the Treaty and international agreements as well as decisions of the 
Council on Collective Security that have been taken in the development of the Treaty 
are obligations for the member-states of the Organization (henceforth, referred to as 
member-states) and for the Organization itself.  
                                                 
278 J. H. Saat, The Collective Security Treaty Organization, (UK: Conflict Studies Research Center, 
2005), pp. 12-19. 
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Chapter II  
Goals & Principles  
Article 3  
The goals of the Organization are the strengthening of peace, international and 
regional security and stability, protection - on a collective basis - of the independence 
and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member-states. In order to 
accomplish these goals the member-states give priority to political resources.  
Article 4  
In its activities the Organization cooperates with states which are not members of the 
Organization and maintains relations with international intergovernmental 
organizations active in the field of security. The Organization contributes to the 
formation of a just, democratic world-order, based on the universal principles of 
international law.  
Article 5  
The Organization operates based upon deep respect for the independence, the 
voluntary participation and the equality of rights and obligations of the member-
states. It also acts on the basis of non-interference in affairs that are subject to the 
national jurisdiction of the member-states.  
Article 6  
This Charter does not affect the rights and obligations of the member-states with 
respect to other international agreements in which the member-states participate.  
Chapter III  
Direction Of Activities  
Article 7  
In order to accomplish the goals of the Organization, the member-states take joint 
measures to establish - within its framework - an effective system of collective 
security, to set up coalition (regional) armed troops (forces) and organs to control 
these, to develop the military infrastructure, preparation of military personnel and 
specialists for the armed forces and to supply them with the necessary armaments 
and military technological equipment.  
The State-Parties take decisions on the deployment on its territories of armed troops 
(forces), objects of the military infrastructure of states, who are not members of the 
Organization after the conduct of immediate consultation (agreement) with the other 
member-states.  
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Article 8  
The State-Parties coordinate and unite their efforts in the struggle against 
international terrorism and extremism, against illegal trade in narcotics, psychotropic 
substances or arms, against organized trans-national crime, illegal migration and 
other threats to the security of member-states.  
The State-Parties will implement their activities in these directions – also - in close 
cooperation with all interested states and international inter-governmental 
organizations under the aegis of the UN.  
Article 9  
The State-Parties will agree and coordinate their foreign-policy on international and 
regional security problems – also - by making use of the consultative mechanisms 
and procedures of the Organization.  
Article 10  
The State-Parties take measures to develop the Treaty’s legal base, that provides the 
regulations for the functioning of the collective security system and to harmonize 
national legislation on issues, such as defence, military development and security.  
Chapter IV  
The Bodies Of The Organization  
Article 11  
The bodies of the Organization are:  
a: the Council on Collective Security (henceforth referred to as Council)  
b: the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (henceforth referred to as  
CMFA)  
c: the Council of Ministers of Defence (henceforth referred to as CMD)  
d: the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Councils (henceforth  
referred to as CSSC)  
The Secretariat of the Organization (henceforth referred to as Secretariat) is the 
Organization’s body that is permanently operational.  
The functions and order of work of the above mentioned bodies is regulated by this 
Charter and also by individual Provisions that are confirmed by the Council.  
Article 12  
The decisions of the Council, the CMFA, the CMD and the CSSC on issues, with the 
exception of procedural matters, are taken on the basis of consensus.  
Any of the member-states has one vote during voting. The order of voting, including 
on procedural issues, is regulated by the Rules of procedure of the bodies of the 
Organization, that are confirmed by the Council. 
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Decisions of the Council and decisions taken in its implementation by the CMFA, 
the CMD, and the CSSC are obligations for the member-states and will be implanted 
in the order established by national legislation.  
Article 13  
The Council is the highest body of the Organization.  
The Council reviews principal issues concerning the activities of the Organization 
and takes decisions aimed at the accomplishment of its goals and tasks. It also 
guarantees the coordination and joint action of member-states to accomplish these 
objectives.  
The Council consists of the heads of the member-states.  
Sessions of the Council may be attended by ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of 
defence, the secretaries of the security councils of the member-states, the Secretary-
General of the Organization and invited parties.  
The Council has the right to set up permanent or ad hoc working groups or subsidiary 
bodies of the Organization.  
The Chairman of the Council (henceforth referred to as Chairman) is the head of 
state of the country on whose territory the given session of the Council is taking 
place, unless the Council decides otherwise. The powers and obligations of the 
Chairman remain in place until the next session of the Council takes place.  
If the Chairman is not able to fulfil his functions, a new Chairman will be elected for 
the remaining period.  
In the period in between Council sessions, the Permanent Council with the 
Organization (henceforth referred to as Permanent Council) deals with the 
coordination of interaction between the member-states, during the implementation of 
decisions taken by the bodies of the Organization.  
The Permanent Council consists of Authorized Representatives (henceforth referred 
to as AUR) that are assigned by the member-states in correspondence with the 
Provision confirmed by the Council.  
Article 14  
The CMFA is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues 
dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of 
foreign policy.  
Article 15  
The CMD is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues 
dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of 
defence policy, military development and military-technological cooperation.  
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Article 16  
The CSSC is the consultative and executive body of the Organization on issues 
dealing with the coordination of interaction between the member-states in the field of 
their national security interests.  
Chapter V  
Secretariat  
The Secretariat is responsible for the organizational, information, analytical and 
consultative actions necessary for the activities of the bodies of the Organization.  
The Secretariat - in interaction with the Permanent Council - prepares drafts of the 
decisions and other documents of the Organization.  
The Secretariat consists of citizens of the member-states on the basis of quota 
(functionaries) that are proportionate to the size of the contribution of the member-
states to the budget of the Organization and also of citizens, who are hired on the 
basis of an employment contract (co-worker).  
The functions, the order of formation and work of the Secretariat are defined by the 
corresponding Provision confirmed by the Council.  
The Secretariat is located in the city of Moscow, Russian Federation. The conditions 
of the presence of the Secretariat on the territory of the Russian Federation are 
regulated on the basis of a corresponding international agreement.  
Article 18  
The Secretary-General of the Organization (henceforth referred to as Secretary-
General) is the highest administrative functionary of the Organization and is the head 
of the Secretariat.  
The Secretary-General is appointed by decision of the Council for the duration of 
three years from among citizens of the member-states on the proposal of the CMFA.  
The Secretary-General is accountable to the Council and participates in the sessions 
of the Council, of the CMFA, of the CMD, the CSSC and the Permanent Council.  
The Secretary-General, in accordance with decisions of the Council, coordinates the 
compilation of drafts of corresponding proposals and documents of the bodies of the 
Organization. The Secretary-General also establishes working relations with other 
international intergovernmental organizations and states that are not members of the 
Organization.  
The Secretary-General is the Depositary with regard to this Charter and other 
international agreements and documents that were reached in the framework of the 
Organization.  
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Chapter VI  
Membership  
Membership of the Organization is open to any state that shares its goals and 
principles and that is willing to take upon itself the obligations contained in this 
Charter and in other valid agreements and decisions that exist in the framework of 
the Organization.  
The decision on admittance to the Organization is taken by the Council.  
Each member-state has the right to withdraw from the Organization. After it has 
dealt with its obligations in the framework of the Organization, such a state will 
submit an official notification on its withdrawal to the Depositary of the Charter, not 
later than 6 months before the date of withdrawal.  
The order of admittance and withdrawal from the Organization is defined by the 
corresponding Provision, confirmed by the Council.  
Article 20  
In case of non-fulfilment by a member-state of the provisions of this Charter, the 
decisions of the Council and of other bodies of the Organization, the Council can 
suspend its participation in the activities of the bodies of the Organization.  
In case of continued non-fulfilment by the member-state with regard to the stated 
obligations, the Council may decide on its expulsion from the Organization.  
Decisions on these issues in relation to a given member-state are taken without 
regard for its vote.  
The order of suspension of participating of a member-state in the activities of the 
Organization or its expulsion from the Organization is defined by the corresponding 
Provision that has been confirmed by the Council.  
Chapter VII  
Observers  
Article 21  
The status of observer with the Organization can be granted to a state that is not a 
member of the Organization and also to an international organization, in reaction to 
an official written request sent to the Secretary-General. The Council decides on the 
allocation, the suspension or the annulment of the status of observer.  
The participation of observers in the sessions and meetings of the bodies of the 
Organization is regulated by the Rules of procedure of the bodies of the 
Organization.  
 132 
Chapter VIII  
Legal Capacity, Privileges & Immunities  
Article 22  
The Organization has on the territory of each member-state the legal capacity 
necessary for the accomplishment of its goals and tasks.  
The Organization can cooperate with non-member states and uphold relations with 
international intergovernmental organizations that are active in the field of security. 
It can come to international agreements with these parties, aimed at the establishment 
and development of such a cooperation.  
The Organization has the legal rights of a juridical person.  
Article 23  
The privileges and the immunities of the Organization are defined by the 
corresponding international agreement.  
Chapter IX  
Financing  
Article 24  
The financing of the activities of the Secretariat is done at the expense of the budget 
of the Organization.  
The budget of the Organization is based upon the individual contributions of the 
state-members that have been confirmed by the Council.  
The budget of the Organization does not have a deficit.  
The draft budget of the Organization for each budget year is compiled by the 
Secretariat in agreement with the member-states and in accordance with the 
Provision on the Order of formation and implantation of the budget of the 
Organization. The budget of the Organization is confirmed by the Council.  
The member-states are independently responsible for the expenses incurred with the 
participation of its representatives and experts in meetings and sessions of the bodies 
of the Organization and other events that are conducted in the framework of the 
Organization, and also for the expenses related with the activities of the AUR.  
Article 25  
If a state-member does not comply with its obligation to pay its debts with regard to 
the budget of the Organization within two years, the Council will decide on the 
suspension of the rights of citizens of that state to apply for quota vacancies in the 
framework of the Organization and also on the deprivation of the rights to vote in the 
bodies of the Organization until the debt has been fully paid off. 05/09 The 
Collective Security Treaty Organization 19  
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Chapter X  
Concluding Provisions  
This Charter is subject to ratification and will enter into force on the date that the 
Depositary will receive the last written notification on ratification from the states that 
have signed.  
The Charter can - with the agreement of all member states - be updated with changes 
and annexes, which will be contained in separate Protocols.  
The Protocols of changes and annexes to the Charter will be an integral part of the 
Charter and will enter into force according to the order established by Article 27 of 
this Charter.  
Reservations to the Charter are not admissible.  
Any discussions regarding the interpretation and the application of the provisions of 
this Charter will be decided by consultation and negotiations between the interested 
state-members. In case it proves to be impossible to come to agreement on this issue, 
the matter will be referred to the Council for review.  
Article 28  
The official and working language of the Organization is Russian.  
Article 29  
This Charter will be registered with the Secretariat of the UN in correspondence with 
the provisions of article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Completed in Kishinev 
[Moldova] on 7 October 2002, in one authentic copy in Russian. The original is kept 
by the Depositary, who will send a certified copy to all states that have signed this 
Charter. 
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